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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
“THE WILD EXPERIMENT” AND ITS AFTERMATH:   
HOW COURTS SETTLED CONFLICT AND  
QUESTIONS OF POWER IN HIGHER EDUCATION, 1900-1930 
 
Between 1900 and 1930, who determined the balance of power between 
higher education and the state when conflicts arose?  This study presents an 
untold story of how courts settled disputes that stemmed from public officials’ 
attempts to rein in spending and influence among colleges in their states.  These 
disputes followed what Frank Blackmar in 1890 referred to as a “wild experiment” 
with higher education’s growth and planning.  Colleges desired to expand, 
acquire additional funding, and function as independently as possible, while 
public officials and legislatures sought to exercise influence and power over 
those colleges.  This laid the groundwork for conflict and a power struggle.  In the 
absence of coordinating boards, accrediting agencies, and a host of regulations 
that we are accustomed to today, courts regulated the balance of power between 
states and colleges.  Many of the cases covered in this study have not been 
discussed in a scholarly setting.  This study evaluates twenty-four legal cases to 
add another chapter to the early twentieth century history of higher education—
one that highlights conflict and power struggles that helped shape the 
relationships between colleges and states during the decades that followed. 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction, Literature Review, and Methodology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Between 1900 and 1930, who determined the balance of power between 
higher education and the state when conflicts arose?  This study presents an 
untold story of how courts settled conflicts that stemmed from public officials’ 
attempts to rein in spending and influence among colleges in their states.  In the 
absence of the agencies that we are accustomed to today—state coordinating 
boards, accrediting agencies, and federal executive and legislative oversight—it 
was left to the courts to regulate the balance of power between states and 
colleges.  This study presents research that has previously gone undocumented 
in the story of higher education’s development in the early 1900s.  
The prologue that gave rise to these court cases is important and set the 
stage for the conflicts and power struggles that we see documented in these 
legal proceedings.  Writing for the United States Bureau of Education in 1890, 
Frank Blackmar referred to what had occurred with planning and funding in 
higher education through the late 1800s as a “wild experiment” (p. 39).  If we 
consider the revolution that occurred within higher education during the 1800s 
due to increased federal and state funding of public higher education, and 
particularly by the 1860s due to the federal Morrill Land Grant program, it is easy 
to understand why Blackmar used such a colorful descriptor.  The “wild 
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experiment” and the ensuing landscape has been characterized by historians 
such as Clark Kerr (1982) as having created an untidy relationship between 
governments and colleges:  they “entered into a common-law marriage 
unblessed by predetermined policies and self-surveys—but nonetheless formed 
a very productive union” (pp. 49-50).   
It was this experimentation and lack of formalized or mature policies that 
led to a vacuum of certainty about whether states or colleges held the higher 
authority in important matters.  Critics helped fill the vacuum, arguing that higher 
education’s increasing influence was also accompanied by wastefulness and 
inefficiency.  After all, colleges attracted such a small segment of the population 
but enjoyed increasingly generous appropriations via federal grant funds and/or 
from state coffers.  As this study will show, those critics were often state 
constitutional officers—state auditors, treasurers, and attorneys general.   
Judging from their actions, they viewed themselves as lobbying on the front lines 
to protect limited state treasuries and taxpayers from waste or inefficiencies. 
In summary, colleges desired to expand, acquire funding, and function as 
independently as possible, while state officials and legislatures sought to 
exercise influence and power over those colleges.  This was the recipe for 
conflict.  In a given state, would a college control its own destiny with minimal 
state influence, or would the colleges be managed and subjected to oversight by 
their respective states?  That was the fundamental question that state courts 
answered.  In doing so, courts became the arbiters of power.
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Research Agenda and Questions 
 There is a substantial quantity of cases from this time period.  From 1900 
to 1930, there were 443 reported court cases that involved higher education 
(Elliot & Chambers, 1936).  The majority of these cases were argued at the state 
level rather than in federal courts.  These cases cover a wide range of topics—
constitutional autonomy of public institutions, tax-exempt status for private 
colleges, social issues, employment and termination disputes, eminent domain 
powers, race, and many others.  Each of these topics is interesting and 
deserving of study.  However, this dissertation’s focus on power struggles 
between colleges and states necessarily excludes many of those cases.  This 
study relies on those cases that highlight power-related conflicts between state 
entities (usually elected officials or legislatures) and colleges.  Chapter Two 
explains the selection of cases.  
 Research questions include: 
• What was the role of courts in determining the balance of power 
between higher education and the state when conflicts arose? 
• Were court decisions meaningful either to individual states or to the 
national conversation about higher education?  In other words, did 
these cases matter? 
• Who were the actors in these conflicts?   
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• What lessons are evident about the history of higher education from 
studying these cases? 
Significance of the Study 
 
 The period of 1900 to 1930 was critical for higher education.  As 
discussed in the literature review section, the period leading up to 1930 is often 
characterized by colleges having had limited or uneven intervention from 
governments.  After all, if one looks for evidence of such intervention, it is natural 
to scour historical documents for evidence such as accrediting agencies or 
centralized governing boards.  Such evidence is limited, suggesting limited 
involvement from governments.  This study uses a different kind of evidence—
legal cases, which are not utilized frequently—to build a case that many state 
officials actually were quite involved with managing—perhaps interfering—with 
public colleges.  This study enhances the narrative about the time period that 
predates the more formal and direct methods of involvement that we have seen 
in American higher education for the past few decades.   
  
  
 
5 
 
Historical Context 
 
The beginning point of this study—the early 1900s—is not arbitrary, as it 
represents a time of great change and growth in higher education.  Veysey 
(1965) discusses at length the changing nature of the American university in the 
early 1900s.  Thelin (2004) also describes the late 1800s to early 1900s as the 
“golden age” of higher education (p. 155).  Geiger (2011) notes the increasing 
faculties and student enrollments that, combined with an increasingly complex 
curriculum and structure, led to the growth of administrative functions.  Veysey, 
Thelin, and Geiger thus characterize around 1900 as a turning point for higher 
education and a sensible beginning point for this study.  The ending point of 1930 
is used due to the onset of the Great Depression and significant changes in 
higher education, which Hill summarized in 1934: “Emergency legislation of 
1930-1933 has not only greatly increased the control over institutional finance by 
the governors of some states, but has also enlarged the powers of governors to 
reorganize the whole administration of higher education” (p. 39).  Given the 
significant changes that had occurred by 1900 and following 1930, this study 
uses those beginning and ending dates as its criteria. 
As higher education grew, criticism emerged.  Henry Pritchett, president of 
the Carnegie Foundation, was one of the industry’s chief critics—or at the very 
least, the person with the loudest voice who raised significant questions about its 
efficiency.  In a 1926 article in the American Law School Review, he noted that, 
from 1890 to 1920, “the burden of taxation that has fallen upon the citizens of 
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every state of the Union has grown in an unprecedented fashion” (p. 172).  
Describing the higher education system, he wrote, “Inquiries of an exact sort are 
now being made to ascertain the cost of the existing school system in various 
states, and to ascertain at the same time the sources of taxation whence the 
support of the school system comes, and to compile simultaneously a statement 
of the legal authorization for these expenditures” (p. 171).  He also advocated 
efforts “to study…the present and prospective costs involved with special 
reference to economics and efficiency of expenditures, the relationship of 
educational costs to other necessary governmental expenditures…” (p. 171).  
Pritchett’s comments reveal that the experimentation that Blackmar (1890) 
discussed was facing new skepticism.     
There is also evidence of a growing dissatisfaction with how government 
agencies were performing during this period.  An article published in 1925 in the 
American Bar Association Journal echoed Pritchett’s comments in its discussion 
of how the growth in state governments and expenditures had led to great 
efficiency problems.  The journal quoted Illinois Governor Frank Lowden from 
1917, who characterized government in a most unflattering way: 
The state has become more complex.  Its sphere of action has been 
increased. The police power has been extended, and state regulation and 
control of matters pertaining to the public health, welfare and safety has 
assumed wide and extensive proportions. No occupation, trade or 
employment has escaped.  A great mass of legislation, much of it 
illconsidered, has been enacted. . . Administrative agencies have been 
multiplied in bewildering confusion.  They have been created without 
reference to their ability, economically and effectively to administer the 
laws. Our finance administration is chaotic, illogical and confused. . . 
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Something goes wrong, and we enact a law and there the matter rests. 
We are confronted with a problem requiring solution, and then we pass the 
problem on to a commission and felicitate ourselves that we have solved 
the problem. Progress is the law of life. The progress needed most now is 
progress in administration. . . To meet these obligations, democracy must 
show a constantly increasing efficiency in government. That is the test 
which we now must meet, and if we do not meet it, democracy is doomed. 
(Robinson, 1925, p. 787) 
 
Governor Lowden’s comments, while not directed specifically toward higher 
education, supply us with a more thorough view of the landscape.  Higher 
education, like state governments, had grown significantly in such a short period 
of time, and many of the legal cases discussed in this study suggest an attempt, 
to use Lowden’s word, to “test” how higher education could be more efficient and 
accountable. 
 Some scholars have noted the additional scrutiny that higher education 
endured.  Barrow (1990) argues that, due in part to low enrollments in college, 
“political support for public higher education was often tenuous and ambivalent at 
best.  Public college administrators and state legislators were subjected to 
conflicting demands for the expansion of public higher educational opportunities 
and a hostile popular reaction to its costs” (p. 96).  As a result of this scrutiny, 
Barrow finds that “continued growth of higher education had to be justified in 
terms of its rate of return to the public” (p. 96).  As a practical example of this 
scrutiny, Barrow notes that the federal Bureau of Education published 126 policy-
related publications between 1902 and 1915, compared to only two such 
publications prior to 1901 (pp. 96-97).   
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 Echoing Barrow’s observations, we also see scrutiny of higher education 
building from organized labor.  In 1918, the American Federation of Labor 
commented on the growth and role of higher education in its convention’s annual 
report, stating that it “believes that the upper years of elementary school should 
be reorganized to afford diversified training, so that boys and girls who cannot go 
on to higher schools, will receive training specifically designed for their needs, 
and not be compelled as at present to prepare for a role they will never play” (p. 
320).  Graham (2005) likewise reflects on the disconnect between higher 
education in the early 1900s and what most Americans needed and wanted:  
“Not until the 1890s…with the introduction of the Babcock test for milk fat devised 
at the University of Wisconsin, did any of the institutions have a useful, 
commercially viable product from their efforts.  No wonder farmers were reluctant 
to send their children to study at these places” (p. 206).  In summary, at a time 
when public colleges were seeking and/or receiving additional resources and 
sought to preserve or expand their autonomy, there were elements within society 
that questioned higher education’s relevance.   
 What are we to make of this historical context?  Consider that there was 
an increasing focus on efficiency and outcomes combined with skepticism about 
whether governments were acting in the best interests of citizens.  Now, let us 
contrast that to higher education:  growing, but still directly benefitting only a 
sliver of the population; having received an influx of appropriations from federal 
land grant initiatives; asking for more funds from states; and, all the while, 
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seeking to preserve its independence.  In summary, higher education sought 
more resources and greater independence at a time when resources were either 
scarce and/or enduring additional scrutiny.  This chasm set the stage for many of 
the conflicts we see in the court cases presented in this study. 
Literature Review 
 
 Blackmar’s (1890), The History of Federal and State Aid to Higher 
Education in the United States, a publication of the U.S. Bureau of Education, 
anticipated the debate that would occur in higher education for the coming few 
decades.  Blackmar’s notion of the balance of power is different from how we 
frame the issue today.  Rather than arguing that colleges mismanaged public 
funds, he instead found that states’ haphazard approaches to higher education 
were ineffective and that states needed to provide additional support, enact more 
legislation, and increase funding:  “…the lawgivers of new States hastened to 
plant universities, which had to pass through long periods of inactivity and 
meager support…during which the handling of the funds, in many instances, was 
a wild experiment” (pp. 38-39).  Blackmar states that the “wild experiment” was 
“partly due to the light of experience, and partly to the influence of the 
Congressional grant in 1862.  There is also to be taken into account the fact that 
all of the schools, both private and public, of the South and West are crowded 
beyond their capacity; that is, beyond their capacity to furnish a liberal education, 
or even to give students what they demand” (pp. 38-39).  Furthermore, he 
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criticizes legislative action as the source of the problems:  “the facts before us 
show a vast amount of weak and misdirected legislation in the management of 
the funds granted by the Federal Government and the several States for carrying 
on institutions of learning.  There are exceptions to this generalization, but they 
are not abundant” (p. 38).  If we accept Blackmar’s contention that legislation 
was weak, ineffective, or unclear as higher education approached the beginning 
of the twentieth century, it makes more clear why many of the court cases cited 
in this study (and beyond this study’s scope) existed. 
 In the late 1950s, Glenny (1959) assembled one of the first publications 
that synthesized how public institutions were coordinated by states, perhaps 
recognizing that those relationships had become more complicated.  The 
publication, Autonomy of Public Colleges:  The Challenge of Coordination, was 
funded by the Carnegie Foundation.  Glenny observed that, in the earlier part of 
the century, coordinating boards and similar agencies had been established in 
response to primarily two factors:  the increasing complexity of higher education 
and the increasing size of state government agencies.  Higher education was 
becoming increasingly complex because, “With increasing urbanization and the 
expansion of population …Universities began extensive research programs in the 
physical and biological sciences; provided new services for farmers, industries, 
and other special-interest groups; added professional schools in new areas such 
as social work, public administration, industrial relations, and municipal 
management; further specialized in agriculture, medicine, and dentistry; and 
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increased course offerings in almost all previously existing academic fields” (p. 
13).   
Glenny also finds that colleges also became victims of growth:  “The 
multiplication of institutions, as in Georgia where twenty-six were established, 
and the subsequent expansion of programs often exceeded the needs and the 
funds of the states and brought financial problems which ambitious legislatures 
and boards failed to anticipate.  Each institution endeavored to obtain adequate 
appropriations by intensive lobbying” (p. 13).  Regarding the second reason for 
increased coordination (the increasing size of state government), Glenny finds 
that the structure and increased funding for state universities paralleled that of 
other state projects, such as infrastructure, health, and social programs.  Finally, 
Glenny writes that the need for coordination of colleges was the result of “the 
demands of economy- and efficiency-minded legislatures [searching] for expert 
appraisal of relative needs and projected expansion of the several institutions” (p. 
17). 
Echoing a 1933 Carnegie Foundation report that he cited, Glenny 
describes the environment for public institutions as one in which each college 
“requests support from the legislature for the programs which it believes 
desirable and attempts to obtain as much as possible of the funds available for 
higher education,” leading to a “rivalry” among a state’s public colleges (p. 17).  
Therefore, coordinating boards/agencies were needed to sort through requests 
for funds and to make sure that requests for funding for a program at one 
  
 
12 
 
institution did not unfairly compete with another institution.  In summary, 
governments wanted to ensure that state funds were being used wisely and 
coordinating boards were logical solutions.  Glenny’s research in this area is 
important not only because it was an early attempt to define the relationships 
between universities and states, but also because it helped to frame the reasons 
why there was conflict.   
 Berdahl’s (1971) work echoes many of Glenny’s observations and 
provides additional insight into higher education governance at the state level.  
He lists states and types of coordinating agencies, with each state’s coordinating 
board classified by type: voluntary association, coordinating board, consolidated 
governing board, and no state agency.  Each agency’s creation year is also 
listed.  Among the 48 states with coordinating boards when he published his 
research in 1971, eleven were established prior to 1930, three between 1931 and 
1940, two between 1941 and 1950, eight between 1951 and 1960, and twenty-
four between 1961 and 1970 (pp. 34-35).  For the sake of this study, it is 
noteworthy that less than one-quarter of states had any type of coordinating 
board prior to 1930, which is another possible explanation for the cases that we 
see. 
Like Glenny, Berdahl discusses the history behind why states pursued 
coordinating boards. Referring to the late 1800s, he writes, “During this period of 
rapid growth, state governments learned that the assumption that lay governing 
boards would protect the public interest was only partially correct.  Although the 
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lay trustees usually worked conscientiously to avoid wasting public funds, they 
were also understandably ambitious for their institutions.  Thus they sometimes 
advanced proposals for expansion and for new programs which, taken by 
themselves, may have been legitimate but which…[exceeded] the state’s 
resources or needs” (p. 27).  Berdahl’s commentary is important because it 
supports the argument that higher education by 1900 was a likely target for 
critics.   
 The arguments outlined by Blackmar, Glenny, and Berdahl overlap and 
are generally consistent.  Although they (especially Glenny and Berdahl) focus 
primarily on coordinating boards and not as much on the larger picture of a 
power struggle, their contributions are nonetheless meaningful.  However, other 
scholars have taken different approaches and reached different conclusions.  In 
2001, Zumeta published a chapter, Public Policy and Accountability in Higher 
Education:  Lessons from the Past for the New Millenium, which focuses on the 
present state of accountability and provides a historical perspective.  He 
describes that the period following the Morrill Act was one during which “states 
did not generally involve themselves deeply…They were normally satisfied to let 
academics decide most policy matters about what to teach and study, who was 
qualified to teach and enroll…and how the academic enterprise was organized” 
(p. 161).  He explains why this was the case:  “Why did legislators and governors 
leave the internal workings of these public institutions alone for much of their 
history?  Early on, political leaders tended to be somewhat in awe of highly 
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education men.  They were very proud of their state’s collegiate creations and 
eager to see them develop and achieve greatness” (p. 161).  In summary, 
Zumeta concluded that state/college conflict is generally a modern phenomenon 
and that there was a hands-off approach from policymakers. 
One recent scholar who addresses the higher education power struggle in 
the early 1900s is McClendon (2008).  As a result of many public universities 
being established in the late 1800s (resulting in part from the Morrill Act), states 
became more cognizant of governance issues by the early 1900s.  McClendon 
points out that Florida was the first state to establish a governing board in 1905, 
and that, “By 1932, higher education in twelve states had been organized in a 
centralized manner through the creation of a single governing board for all 
institutions” (p. 65).  McClendon also reports how the Carnegie Foundation 
conducted a number of studies during the 1930s that reflected upon changes in 
governance, and said that such studies were “ignored in many late-century [late 
twentieth century] commentaries on American campus-state relations” (p. 65).  In 
a separate article, McClendon, Hearn, and Deaton (2006) contrast the 
accountability environment of the twenty-first century with an earlier era during 
which “accountability often referred to the design of statewide governance 
structures capable of accommodating the simultaneous need for institutional 
autonomy and external oversight of campus decision-making.  The central 
question…was:  Precisely which activities and functions of public colleges and 
universities (e.g., academic programs, budgets, tuition setting, and so forth) 
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should be dictated by the state and which should be left to the discretion of 
campuses?” (p. 1).  Many of the cases presented in this study revolve around or 
are closely related to that central question. 
Novak and Leslie (2000) also address some elements of state/college 
conflicts.  They write about some of the Carnegie publications that McClendon, 
Hearn, and Deaton (2006) describe above and characterize those publications as 
having been ignored by scholars.  Those Carnegie reports, which reflected upon 
state coordination of higher education and financial issues, were key studies of 
what was still an early history of higher education structures.  Novak and Leslie 
argue that such studies resulted from “the nation’s Depression-era fiscal crisis” 
and that they sought to answer questions such as whether higher education 
could become more efficient with the spending of public funds (p. 58).  They find 
that colleges “faced unprecedented scrutiny” due to severe budget shortfalls (p. 
56).  Although limited in scope, Novak and Leslie’s finding that tight budgets led 
organizations like Carnegie to ask questions about colleges’ management and 
efficiencies is important.  
In summary, previous scholarship indicates that there was a recipe for 
conflict between colleges and states in the early 1900s.  This research is still 
fairly underdeveloped, however, which some scholars have acknowledged.  This 
study will show that a significant piece of evidence missing from scholarship is a 
discussion of court cases.  There were clearly important issues facing higher 
education around 1900.  With only a handful of states establishing coordinating 
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boards, the existence of few accrediting agencies, and limited federal oversight, 
the courts became the entities that considered and answered important 
questions about higher education.   
Legal Analysis as History 
 
 Using legal cases to improve our understanding of higher education has 
been embraced by a number of scholars.  Elliott and Chambers (1936) published 
what was likely the first anthology of higher education legal cases and supplied 
updates until the 1970s.  Chambers (1952) describes the study of legal cases as 
being designed to “provide proof of the never-ending problem of adjusting the 
scope, controls, and operations of our colleges and universities to the 
complicated and changing conditions of modern democratic life” (p. v).  Several 
other higher education legal anthologies have followed—Alexander and 
Solomon’s (1972) College and University Law, Edwards and Nordin’s (1979) 
Higher Education and the Law, and more recent publications such as Olivas’ 
(2015) The Law and Higher Education.  In these publications, one can easily find 
examples of how case law is used to supply information about the past and 
present state of higher education. 
 That being said, these publications tend to be written with a managerial 
perspective in mind rather than a historical perspective.  That is, scholars aspire 
to educate the reader about the results of legal cases so that the reader can be 
more informed when encountering particular legal issues in academia.  This 
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dissertation embraces the methodology of several higher education legal authors 
with its focus on case law but differs from them in a number of ways.  This study 
focuses solely on those cases decided between 1900 and 1930, attends to the 
issue of how courts regulated power between states and public institutions, and 
is designed to show how these patterns of power struggles shaped higher 
education in ways that have previously gone undocumented.  Using legal cases 
to construct a narrative has been endorsed by several scholars.  For example, 
Russo (1996) reflects upon case law research as a method that can greatly 
enhance our understanding of higher education.  Alder’s (1996) suggestions 
regarding how to proceed with research in this area were also valuable. 
How Cases Were Selected 
 
 In 1936, Edward Elliott (president of Purdue University) and M.M. 
Chambers (staff member of the American Youth Commission of the American 
Council on Education) published what was likely the first book on higher 
education law:  The Colleges and the Courts:  Judicial Decisions Regarding 
Institutions of Higher Education in the United States.  In the Appendix, Elliott and 
Chambers list 443 cases organized by state that dealt with higher education that 
had been ruled on by federal and state courts from 1900 to 1930.  Many more 
cases fall outside of this time frame.  This list of 443 cases was the starting point 
for this study.   
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These 443 cases cover many types of litigation:  governance conflicts, 
employment issues, disagreements about donations, student grades, the 
legitimacy of degrees (diploma mills), racial tensions, and many others.  This 
study explores how case law helps fill in gaps in our understanding of how power 
questions were settled from 1900 to 1930 between public institutions and states.  
As such, this study focuses only on a selection of cases that explore that very 
issue—that is, how questions of power were settled between states and colleges.   
The 443 cases were reviewed based on case summaries and actual court 
decisions using Lexis Nexis.  Using the narrow definition stated above, 43 cases 
emerged whose criteria fit the study.  Each of those cases was reviewed more 
thoroughly.  Some cases, such as those within the same state and with 
overlapping themes, were generally excluded, leading to a selection of twenty-
four cases.  
The selected cases are not homogeneous.  Although they all address 
power struggles between states and colleges, the themes are quite different.  
Cases involve themes such as student scholarships, curricular issues, the 
expenditure of land grant funds, the propriety of different types of expenditures, 
and several others.  In addition, the cases represent a variety of outcomes—
some favor colleges, some favor states, and others have mixed results.  In 
summary, even within the narrow confines of discussing power disputes, there is 
a wide range of topics and legal outcomes. 
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Although the cases address a number of different issues, this study 
classifies each case into one of three categories or themes:  financial controls, 
management of federal funds, and other governance issues.  These 
classifications are admittedly imperfect, and some cases could legitimately be 
included in more than one category.  In fact, it becomes apparent when reading 
these cases that they—much like any other dramatic events that we experience 
in higher education—rarely are only about one issue.  However, categorizing the 
cases hopefully makes the reading experience less daunting and aids in the 
identification of overlapping themes among the various cases.   
Evaluating these twenty-four cases from among eighteen states allows us 
to identify patterns and themes.  The narrative presented for each case answers 
the following questions:  (1) who were the major players in the litigation, (2) what 
was the source of the disagreement between/among the parties involved, (3) 
what issues did the court consider when making its decision, (4) what was the 
court’s ultimate decision, and (5) what was the case’s significance? 
Cases are listed in Appendix A. 
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Chapter Two:  Case Findings and Discussion 
 
This study’s review of each of the twenty-four selected cases will discuss 
the following elements regarding each case:  the major players, the source of the 
conflict, a summary of each party’s arguments, the outcome, the reasoning 
behind the court’s decision, and the implications for the balance of power 
between the state and colleges.  Because of each case’s complexities, the 
following discussions necessarily will vary in terms of length and depth.  This 
analysis is not intended to elaborate on each case’s every detail, but instead will 
focus on facts that illustrate each case’s importance and relevance to higher 
education.  The order of the cases follows the outline described in Appendix A.   
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Section 1:  The Power to Control Public Institution Finances 
 
The Indiana State Board of Finance et al. v. State of Indiana, ex rel. 
Trustees of Purdue University (188 Ind. 36, 1919) 
 
 Although the legal issue in this case technically addressed Purdue 
University’s eligibility to receive certain tax revenues, the underlying issue in this 
case was whether the state’s tax policy could extend to the public university’s 
entities that were funded by federal sources.  The discord between the Indiana 
State Board of Finance and Purdue followed a legislative act in 1913 that 
provided tax revenue to Purdue along with some other state institutions.  The act 
stipulated that, “’When the funds provided for by this act for said educational 
institutions shall become available, said funds shall constitute the total amounts 
to be paid out of the treasury of the state to said institutions for any purpose, 
thereafter, and all acts and parts of acts in conflict with this provision are hereby 
repealed’” (p. 4).  In summary, the legislature’s act cancelled all other related 
taxes and revenues that the university had received in the past, so any future 
revenues due to university from the state would exclusively derive from the tax 
revenues specified in this new legislative act. 
 The conflict arose when the state’s Board of Finance and the governor 
acted to cancel Purdue’s appropriation for its Agricultural Research Bureau and 
Agricultural Experiment Station.  The Research Bureau received $30,000 in 
annual appropriations, while Experiment Station received $75,000 per year.  
Those appropriations, so argued the Board of Finance and the governor, were 
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voided following the legislature’s passage of the aforementioned law.  The 
university countered that these two ancillary agricultural stations were not a core 
of the university’s mission and therefore not directly related to the university and 
its funding mechanisms.  As such, it argued that those stations’ funding should 
not be impacted by the legislation.   
 To arrive at its decision, the court considered agricultural stations’ history 
and their prior funding model.  The court stated, “[The issue] cannot be fully 
understood without reading in connection therewith the history of the financial 
provisions for maintenance of the university…and for the maintenance of several 
special bureaus stations or departments” (p. 4).  This indicated that the court 
wished to dig more deeply to understand the complex nature of how the 
university and its affiliates had been funded.  The court observed that the source 
of this particular conflict was rooted in a “[f]ailure to observe the distinction” 
between a university’s traditional departments and affiliated entities such as the 
Agricultural Research Bureau and the Agricultural Experiment Station.   
 The court found that “[h]aving given careful consideration to such history… 
the university proper has been maintained to a large extent by appropriations or 
taxes for general and current expenses and for general maintenance, while 
another and distinct line of appropriations has been made not for such 
maintenance, but, by express limitations, separated from such maintenance and 
confined to special purposes and departments” (p. 4).  Those “special purposes 
and departments” included the Research Bureau and Experiment Station.  In 
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addition, the court noted that “the board of trustees of the university had nothing 
to do with this appropriation” for the two entities (p. 4).  The court found many 
other examples of how the two stations were not completely connected to Purdue 
University, finding that Purdue’s trustees were only tangentially involved in 
overseeing the stations’ activities and finances and that the employees of these 
stations were not actually Purdue employees.  The court considered all of this 
evidence and found that, “the trustees, or the treasurer of the university, are only 
designated as agents for the specific purpose of holding such special funds, and 
are not acting in their general capacity as officials of the university.  A prohibition 
of payment to the university of other than the tax, for any purpose, does not 
prevent a payment to the trustees as such special agents” (pp. 5-6).  In 
summary, the court made a distinction between a university and a university’s 
affiliates and found that they cannot be treated as the same with this type of 
legislation. 
 In addition, this case addressed the state’s power to control a university’s 
federal funds.  The original tax legislation exempted land grant funds from being 
cancelled as a result of the new tax’s implementation, meaning that the university 
could continue to receive both land grant revenues as well as the new state tax 
revenue.  Although its funds were safe, the university nonetheless asked the 
court to consider whether the state had power over the funds and whether it was 
even necessary for the legislation to specify an exemption for federal funds.  The 
university contended that, “federal appropriations belong to the university and are 
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not subject to repeal by legislative acts of the state” (p. 8). Conversely, the state’s 
Department of Finance argued that the state had the power to repeal its 
acceptance of the federal funds.  Although there was no practical or immediate 
implication, the court found that “said federal appropriations may be destroyed by 
some act of the state, and that there was occasion for a declaration preventing 
the tax act from affecting the same” (p. 9).  Why is this element of the case 
important?  First, the conversation demonstrates uncertainty regarding how 
federal and state funds would be intermingled—a question that occurred 
frequently with these selected cases.  Second, it is also important that the court 
clarified that although the state legislature does not necessarily have the power 
to micromanage federal funds, it does retain the power to cancel them.    
Barker, President, et al. v. Crum, et al., 177 Ky. 637 (1917) 
Barker is one of the few cases selected that involves a student litigant.  
The student, Crum, sued Henry Stites Barker, the president of the Kentucky 
Agricultural and Mechanical College, now the University of Kentucky.  Although 
the student was the plaintiff, the case’s central theme was the conflict between 
the legislature’s powers and the college’s independence.  However, it was not 
simply a conflict between a legislature and one college, but was a case that 
impacted the futures of all public institutions of higher education in the state.   
At the heart of the suit was a law that the legislature passed in 1908 that 
initiated a new scholarship program at the college.  It stipulated that, “’Each 
county in each state, in consideration of the incomes accruing to said 
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institution…[shall] be entitled to select and send to said university each year one 
or more properly prepared students…free from all charges for tuition, 
matriculation fees, room rent, fuel and lights…[and] shall also be entitled to their 
necessary traveling expenses” (p. 3).  Each county was eligible to send at least 
one student, and more students depending on its population size.  The law also 
specified that the students would be selected as follows:  “selection…shall be 
made by the superintendents of common schools in their respective counties, 
upon competitive examination, on subjects prepared by the faculty of the 
university” and that the exam would be coordinated by a board of examiners (p. 
3).  The law is noteworthy for a few reasons.  First, the notion that colleges were 
expected to repay counties due to the tax revenue they (or, more accurately, 
their residents) supplied is unusual.  In this research, there are no other 
examples of legislatures that established an overt link between a municipality’s 
residents’ payment of taxes and receiving something tangible in return from a 
state institution.  Second, the scope of student expenses that the law covered 
was very generous.  Third, although there is some deference to the college’s 
faculty regarding establishing criteria by which students were tested, it is clear 
that the student selections were made locally, and thus were mostly out of the 
hands of the college.   
In supporting the county scholarship program, the students made four 
arguments that the law was valid, three of which were important to higher 
education.  The students argued that (1) the law “is the result of a contract 
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between the state and the various counties…in consideration of the levying of a 
tax to support the college, certain selected students from each county can attend 
free of the charges in question,” (2) that the legislature’s power to establish 
colleges necessarily meant that it was “given discretion as to the manner in 
which it should be conducted, and who should attend it,” (3) the students 
constituted a class to which certain regulations should not apply, and (4) “that the 
statute will be upheld under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction” (p. 4). 
The court was persuaded by none of the students’ arguments and fully 
supported the university’s claims about the illegality of the law.  Regarding the 
county taxation, the court observed, “We have not…been referred to any facts 
existing between the state and the counties which constitute a contract…And, 
indeed, there is no claim that any formal contract was made or attempted” (p. 6).  
The court added that if there had been an agreement by which “special 
privileges” had been given to the counties in return for their taxes, the state 
constitution would have rendered them void (p. 6).   
Second, the court addressed whether the legislature could control how 
colleges spent their funds.  The court looked to the state constitution and found 
that it “merely declares that the tax then levied for the endowment and 
maintenance of…[the college] should remain until changed by law.  It made no 
declaration as to the expenditure of the money so raised” (p. 6). 
Third, the students had argued to become categorized as a special class 
of citizens because the state constitution generally prevented the expenditure of 
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public funds for individuals.  The university argued that scholarships were not 
legal because of this constitutional prohibition.  The court agreed, stating that the 
scholarship program provided an unfair advantage to selected students:  the 
students are “selected by the county superintendent, and the fortunate students 
thus arbitrarily selected are given money from the state treasury while others who 
have likewise passed the required examination are required to pay their fees and 
traveling expenses” (p. 6).    
Fourth, the court addressed the contemporaneous construction 
argument—the idea that the statute had been in place and followed for several 
years, therefore it should continue as a valid practice:  “when a statute conflicts 
with a plain provision of the constitution the rule of contemporaneous 
construction is not applicable; otherwise it would mean that a violation of the 
constitution would be upheld providing it had continued long enough to give it 
dignity.  The statute which violates the constitution is never effective for any 
purpose; it can not be made constitutional by repeated violations of the 
instrument” (p. 7).  This argument can be found in other cases in this study, and 
courts ruled similarly—that if an act is not constitutional, it cannot be held 
constitutional simply because it has not been challenged in the past. 
 With this decision, the court made critical decisions that impacted the 
balance of power and the development of higher education in Kentucky.  It 
dispelled the idea that municipalities should necessarily expect something in 
return for their funding of higher education.  The court also clarified that higher 
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education’s decision-making and policy-making was independent of influence 
from government.  The court’s declaration that the constitution only established a 
funding mechanism for higher education, but that it did not specify the authority 
over that funding, further solidified higher education’s independence and power.  
This is particularly important because the constitution did not specifically grant 
colleges’ independence from legislative interference, but the court inferred it 
nonetheless.  
 The court’s finding regarding the constitutionality of providing scholarships 
to students is intriguing.  Clearly, this is a finding that no longer deters Kentucky 
colleges from providing scholarships in modern times, and that evolution is 
beyond the scope of this study.  Nonetheless, it appears that the court’s decision 
was intended to have a democratizing effect on higher education—that is, the 
court did not want students to be given preference with scholarship funding 
ostensibly due to a student’s local connections within a given county.  Finally, the 
court’s declaration that contemporaneous construction should not apply in this 
case may initially appear to be an esoteric legal distinction that is less important 
to higher education than it is to constitutional law.  However, if we consider that 
higher education in the state was still relatively young, the idea that higher 
education must be guided by specific laws and policies was certainly an 
important precedent. 
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Bosworth, Auditor, v. State University, et al. (154 Ky. 370, 1913) 
 Kentucky’s supreme court, like its ruling in Barker, made similarly 
important decisions in Bosworth.  The court considered two issues critical to the 
future of higher education in the state.  The first was whether a college may 
employ its own attorney rather than the state attorney general.  The second issue 
addressed appropriations and whether a college’s subsequent appropriations for 
a project necessarily canceled previous appropriations.  Although the two issues 
appear to be distinct, they are actually tied together very closely in this case. 
 The case originated due to the state auditor’s refusal to authorize money 
that the legislature had appropriated.  The money was designated for an 
agricultural experiment station at the State University.  The details of his refusal 
will follow, but court first addressed a challenge by the state attorney general who 
claimed that the college was forbidden from hiring its own attorney.  In this case, 
the attorney general supported the auditor’s position; if the college had been 
unable to hire outside counsel, its ability to challenge the auditor would have 
been significantly curbed, if not altogether impossible.  The attorney general 
relied on state statutes which stipulated that, “’The Attorney General and his 
assistants shall attend to all litigation and business in or out of the State…and no 
State officer, board or trustees or the head of any department of institution of the 
State shall have authority to employ or to be represented by another other 
counsel or attorney-at-law” (pp. 2-3).  If a state agency wished to hire its own 
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counsel, the statute required that it receive permission from the attorney general 
in writing.  
 Such a requirement, if valid, would have presented quite a conundrum for 
the college.  It needed legal counsel for advice and to move the case through the 
proper court channels.  The court ruled that, “The purpose of this provision is to 
protect the State or any department or institution of the Statue from having to pay 
counsel fees…But it was not the purpose of the statute to prevent an institution of 
the State from bringing a suit to test its right when the Attorney General was 
unwilling to employ other counsel.  In this case the Attorney General represents 
the Auditor, and it was not the purpose of the statute to prevent such a suit as 
this being brought” (p. 3).  Therefore, the university was permitted to continue its 
litigation against the state auditor.   
 The remaining major issue—the validity of the act that expanded 
agricultural station funding—is one that the court addressed decisively.  The 
auditor contended that the legislation that expanded the agricultural station in 
1912 was so similar to an act passed in 1910 that the 1912 act was actually an 
amendment to the 1910 act.  If that had been so, the 1912 legislation would have 
been void because state law prohibited such amendments.  To be legitimate, 
such laws had to stand on their own and be published as their own laws.  The 
court noted that the 1910 act and 1912 act were quite dissimilar.  The 1910 act 
was, “’An act to establish a plant for the preparation of hog cholera serum and for 
the distribution of same to the farmers of the State,’” although the act did mention 
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the agricultural experiment station as the facility where the serum would be 
manufactured (p. 3).  By comparison, the 1912 act was intended “’to benefit the 
Agricultural Experiment Station…appropriating money and providing revenues for 
the maintenance of said Experiment Station and for conducting experiments in 
the various lines of Agriculture, and to meet the increased demands made upon it 
as a public institution” (p. 3).  In other words, the 1910 act had a very narrow 
focus, whereas the 1912 act authorized a significantly broader scope for how the 
station would be funded and for its mission.  The court concluded, “The act of 
1912 is in no sense an amendment of the act of 1910.  It enlarges the 
Agricultural Experiment station, but it does not revise the act of 1910” (p. 3). 
 In this case, the auditor and attorney general sought to rein in the power of 
the university.  Imagine the implications if the court had sided with the attorney 
general—the attorney general could have undermined public higher education’s 
power to challenge matters with which the attorney general did not agree or was 
unwilling or unable to provide his office’s resources.  It could have represented a 
dramatic shift in power.  In this particular case, the state auditor would have been 
able to void the expansion of the agricultural station without the risk of being 
challenged.  It would have resulted in a chilling effect on the independence of 
public higher education in the state. 
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Board of Regents of the University of Michigan v. Auditor General (167 
Mich. 444, 1911) 
 
 In the first sentence of its opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court quickly 
summarized the issue:  “the court is asked to decide whether the judgment of the 
auditor general or that of the board of regents shall prevail respecting the 
expenditure of moneys appropriated for the use and maintenance of the 
University” (p. 4).  The moneys referred to in this case were income tax revenues 
collected by the state for the purpose of funding universities.  This case explored 
several issues that were critical for determining the balance of power in 
Michigan’s higher education system.   
 The conflict arose when the state’s auditor general reviewed the 
university’s monthly request for tax revenue funds.  The established process 
involved the university submitting detailed records that demonstrated its eligibility 
for the funds, after which point the auditor would authorize the payment of funds.  
The law stipulated that the funds should be “for the use and maintenance of the 
University of Michigan” (p. 4).   
 The expenditures at issue are interesting because they illuminate how 
college presidents were spending their time.  They totaled $557 and covered the 
following:  “traveling expenses of Dr. Angell, president of the University, in 
attending alumni meetings and inaugurations of presidents of other universities, 
and for traveling expenses of other members of the faculty and officers…in 
attending intercollegiate meetings and conferences…and for the expenses of 
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instructors in accompanying students in inspecting mechanical engineering 
plants” (p. 4).  The auditor general argued that these expenses “were not for the 
use and maintenance of the University…and consequently not for lawful 
purposes under the accounting laws of this State” (p. 4).   
Upon reviewing these records from the previous month, the auditor 
general refused to release any additional revenues to the university “for the 
reason that certain vouchers made by the regents for prior expenditures, which in 
his opinion were unlawful, had not been audited and allowed by him” (p. 4).  
There are three legal issues implicit in the auditor general’s argument:  (1) that 
he had the power to review such expenditures, (2) that he had the power to 
determine the propriety of the expenditures, and (3) he had the power to withhold 
future disbursements of tax revenues to the university if he disapproved of any 
submissions. 
Regarding the first issue, the court cites statutes that outline the fact that 
the auditor general did retain such authority:  “’Such…receipts, when received by 
the auditor general, shall be examined by him, and if found correct shall be so 
endorsed by him; and all vouchers for expenditures, so far as the amount thereof 
shall appear to be for lawful purposes, he shall audit” (p. 5).  Some courts could 
easily have ruled in favor of the auditor general given the statute’s clarity.  
However, the court instead relied on the constitution’s language regarding higher 
education, which states, “the board of regents is made the highest form of juristic 
person known to the law, a constitutional corporation of independent authority, 
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which, within the scope of its functions, is co-ordinate with and equal to that of 
the legislature” (p. 6).  As such, even though the law permitted—in fact, 
required—the auditor general to audit and question such records, the constitution 
ultimately voided his ability to audit university expenses.   
On the second issue, because the university controlled its own finances, 
the court did not comment on the propriety of the expenses.  It did, however, cite 
statutes that affirmed the auditor’s ability to withhold future revenues from an 
agency if it had failed to satisfy audit requirements.  But, the court again noted 
that higher education held a special place in Michigan and clarified the auditor 
general’s powers—or lack thereof—in his attempt to control higher education:  “In 
this case, as in many others, his duties are purely ministerial.  As against the 
discretion of the regents in expenditure of the University funds he exercises no 
judicial functions.  As to him…vouchers for expenditures made within the amount 
of the appropriation, when authorized by the board of regents and properly 
authenticated by the duly constituted officials, are, within the meaning of the law, 
‘for lawful purposes’” (p. 6).   
We should take note of this case’s implications.  In practicality, it meant 
that the regents ostensibly set their own laws.  Of course, it is more complicated 
than that, but if we consider that the auditor general expressed legitimate 
objections to the university’s expenditures and that he was authorized by law to 
review those expenses, the court’s ruling is condemning of his or any other 
elected official’s power compared to that of the university.  Clearly, the auditor’s 
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third contention about his ability to withhold future funds was irrelevant since he 
retained so little power to raise questions about university expenditures. 
This ruling’s implications for the state and its university system are 
obviously compelling, and Michigan is known for having strong constitutional 
provisions for higher education (Hutchens, 2007).  The regents, within reason 
and unless a constitutional change occurred, had free reign to determine their 
own destiny and that of their public institutions.  That it was affirmed with such 
clear and strong language by a court is also important.  It left very little room for 
elected officials to hold the university system accountable, which likely created 
conflicts even beyond those documented in these court cases, particularly as we 
consider that this was a time when (as discussed in the introduction) states 
attempted to become more frugal and were concerned with processes and 
efficiency.   
State Board of Agriculture v. Auditor General (180 Mich. 349, 1914) 
 As we consider the strong support for the Michigan public university 
system in Board of Regents, one might expect the Michigan legislature and 
elected officers to have stayed away from further controversy.  Although it is 
speculative, we might view the State Board of Agriculture case as an outgrowth 
of frustrations that the legislature felt with how powerful the university system 
was becoming.   
In 1913, the Michigan legislature acted to establish an additional revenue 
source (property taxes) that was designed to help fund public higher education—
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specifically the state’s agricultural college.  The case documents do not 
specifically state the amount of the revenues, but it is implied that they would 
total approximately $600,000 (p. 4).  The new source of funds carried a caveat, 
however.  In exchange for accepting the funds, the college of agriculture was 
forced to limit its annual spending to $35,000 for the mechanical and engineering 
department.  Court documents show that for the preceding fiscal year, “there was 
expended $27,000 for supplies, machinery, and maintenance of buildings, and 
about $34,000 for salaries of professors and instructors” (p. 3).  Therefore, even 
the prior year’s expenditures were far out of compliance with—nearly twice the 
amount of—the $35,000 maximum requirement.  The $35,000 requirement is 
further complicated by the fact that much of the department’s funding originated 
from federal grant sources.  
 The court considered whether the legislature indeed knew what it was 
doing when it passed this requirement given that the $35,000 figure appears 
arbitrary.  The court even remarked that, “no reading and no analysis of the 
language employed leaves one entirely certain of the meaning of this provision” 
(p. 4).  A comment made by the auditor general’s attorney suggests that there is 
much more to this story; he referred to this provision and its relevance in 
determining “whether the agricultural college shall continue as a competitor 
against another institution maintained at State expense” (p. 2).  Putting together 
the pieces of this argument and the facts, we may assume that the legislature 
wanted the college of agriculture’s mechanical and engineering department to 
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disappear nearly or completely so that it did not threaten another public 
institution. 
 The court discussed the details of the $35,000 requirement and the 
complicating factors of the external land grant funds but ultimately considered 
them immaterial.  By imposing the $35,000 limitation on the mechanical and 
engineering department’s expenditures, the court stated that “its effect would be 
legislative supervision of the college.  To determine that a department of the 
college which has maintained at a cost of $60,000 annually…shall be from a 
given date maintained at a cost of $35,000 annually….is to determine that it shall 
have fewer supplies, or fewer, or less capable, instructors, or both” (p. 5).  The 
court relied again on the constitutional provisions that provided authority to public 
colleges in these matters:  “The Constitution has given to the relator the general 
supervision of the college and the direction and control of all agricultural college 
funds.  So long as the relator employs them for the purposes intended by the 
grant, it is beyond the power of the legislature to control the relator’s use of the 
funds received from the Federal government and long ago appropriated to the 
agricultural college” (p. 5).  
 Although this case’s implications may not appear as wide-ranging as the 
earlier Board of Regents decision, they are nonetheless critical.  In the prior 
case, the court’s ruling addressed a direct challenge to the public university’s 
autonomy.  In State Board of Agriculture, the challenge was much less direct, but 
it was still an attempt to assert power.  By being closed to the possibility of even 
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this type of interference, the court effectively emasculated the legislature’s 
attempts to establish power over the public colleges. 
State Ex Rel. University of Minnesota and Others v. Ray P. Chase, 175 
Minn. 259 (1928) 
 
 Chase is a case in which the court was clear about power being the 
central issue and the reason for the conflict.  The court faced a critical question—
would the power to control the Minnesota university system rest with the regents 
or with the legislature and governor?  In 1851, the state’s constitution was written 
such that, in the court’s words, “the Board of Regents, in the management of the 
university, is constitutionally independent of all other executive authority” (p. 2).  
The state university system operated with this understanding for several 
decades, until the legislature passed a statute in 1925 that was intended to 
centralize and streamline the operations and finances of state agencies.  As a 
result of the act, power and decision-making would be centralized within a 
Commission of Administration and Finance, with its members appointed by the 
governor with senate approval.  The governor was also permitted to “remove any 
member of the commission at any time without cause,” which clearly provided 
him a new avenue to control higher education’s administrative and financial 
operations (p. 3).  As discussed in Chapter 1, this was a time when many states 
were attempting to become more efficient, so it is unsurprising that the Minnesota 
legislature took this action.   The court even characterized the statute as a 
“reorganization of state government” (p. 4). 
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The case was initiated soon after the law’s passage, when Ray Chase, the 
state auditor, refused to pay an expense that the University of Minnesota 
incurred related to establishing group insurance for university employees.  The 
court considered two separate but related issues:  did the statute apply to the 
University of Minnesota and, if so, was the statute valid? 
 In considering the first question, the court established whether a state 
university is a state agency under the statute.  The statute’s language led to 
uncertainty regarding whether it even applied to higher education.  The court 
summarized the statute with this description:  the Commission of Administration 
and Finance “’claims authority to supervise and control the expenditure of any 
and all moneys’ by or for the university; ‘the making of all contracts’ by the 
several officers, departments, and agencies” and that, “’All of said departments 
and all officials and agencies of the state government shall be subject to this act’” 
(p. 3).  Upon review of the statute’s language, the court found that it was 
intended to apply to higher education, as education was “in the ordinary and 
functional sense, plainly an agency of the state” (p. 3).  This finding is an 
important one, but not altogether surprising because it clarified that, despite any 
claims of independence, the university still is a state entity that is impacted by 
laws passed by the legislature. 
 Because the court established that the statute was applicable to the 
University of Minnesota, it proceeded to determine the statute’s constitutionality.  
The court saw this case not just as a technical constitutional question, but was 
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also clear that it viewed this case as one that addressed critical questions of 
power:  “On the surface of things, the contest is between the Board of Regents 
and the Commission of Administration and Finance…But the real issue is 
between the regents and the governor…The right to control finances is the power 
to dictate academic policy and direct every institutional activity…[The act has 
made] the governor, the final arbiter of all university affairs” (p. 3).  The court 
relied on the state’s original constitutional language to guide its decision, finding 
that the state constitution clearly gave the power to govern the institution to its 
regents:  “the regents were made a ‘body corporate’ with power to govern.  That 
is the power to control…the regents were both the [university’s] sole members 
and the governing board…the people of the state, speaking through their 
constitution, have invested the regents with a power of management of which no 
legislature may deprive them” (pp. 4-5).   
 The result is not only compelling, but so are the court’s statements against 
the state auditor’s arguments.  The auditor had maintained that the constitution 
did not even apply to the University of Minnesota because it (the constitution) 
had specified that the regents were to manage the corporation of higher 
education.  The auditor attempted to draw a distinction between a corporation 
and an institution—suggesting that even if the whole of higher education within 
the state deserved autonomy, an individual institution did not.  The court 
dismissed this argument, describing it as “ingenious” but also “not altogether 
clear” (p. 4).  Despite the court’s easy dismissal, the fact that a state 
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constitutional officer made this argument illustrates an important divide between 
what the auditor saw as the university’s role and how the university viewed itself. 
 The auditor also embraced the argument of “practical construction,” which 
the court said “has so much factual basis that it deserves special attention” (p. 7).  
The auditor referred to instances when, for example, the legislature had revised 
the makeup of the board of regents and the university failed to object.  In another 
example, the legislature established a new board to oversee certain financial 
matters, such as building construction, again without objection from the 
university.  If these acts had gone without challenge from the university, so the 
auditor argued, why should this statute be any different?  The court admitted that 
there was indeed “abundant ammunition for the argument of practical 
construction” (p. 7).  However, it found that practical construction could not apply 
in this case:  “A practical construction of anything written—constitution, statue, or 
contract—is but an aid to interpretation, not to be resorted to unless such an aid 
is required…All the circumstances must be considered which go to make clear 
sense of the words.  But when that sense is made or becomes plain, the process 
of interpretation ends” (p. 7).  In essence, the court found that legislative 
improvisation—particularly with an industry as new at the time as higher 
education—was appropriate, but only when the constitution did not provide 
specific guidance.   
 Whereas most court decisions primarily address the legal merits of a given 
case, the Minnesota court also described its philosophical basis for the decision 
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and made clear that the university should win not only on a narrow legal 
interpretation, but because protecting higher education from political influence 
was the morally just action to take.  The court said that the constitution “put the 
management of the greatest educational institution beyond the dangers of 
vacillating policy, ill informed or careless meddling and partisan ambition that 
would be the case of management by either legislature of executive, chosen at 
frequent intervals…and because of qualities and activities vastly different from 
those which qualify for the management of an institution of higher education” (p. 
8).  In summary, the court viewed the notion that a higher education institution or 
system could be taken over by political forces as inherently dangerous. 
Lincoln University v. George E. Hackmann, Auditor (295 Mo. 118, 1922) 
 This case addressed university finance issues and the legislature’s power 
to make appropriations.  In 1921, the Missouri legislature passed a law that 
impacted the Lincoln Institute, a historically black college.  “The act changed the 
name of Lincoln Institute to Lincoln University, vested the control thereof in a 
board of curators…[and provided money] to purchase additional land and erect 
necessary buildings” (p. 3).  The amount of funding that the legislature 
designated for this purpose was $500,000.  The legislation stipulated that the 
$500,000 be paid out of funds that had not already been appropriated to the 
public school systems in the state. 
 When the new Lincoln University submitted a bill from an architect 
charged with designing new facilities, the state auditor, George Hackmann, 
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rejected the expense.  His refusal was based on his claim that “no portion of the 
public school funds or moneys was unappropriated at that time, and, therefore, 
there were no funds out of which to pay this requisition” (p. 3).  The question of 
whether the funds were actually “unappropriated” was a technical one.  The 
auditor maintained that the legislature had indeed appropriated funds for the 
public school system, but that the funds had simply not all been designated for 
the individual counties.  In other words, it was technically impossible for an 
appropriation from the legislature not to be fully appropriated; instead, an 
appropriation may be undesignated.  The court stated that “we have no doubt 
that the word ‘unappropriated’ was used inadvertently and should be rejected” (p. 
4).  The court went on to say that, “We have held that in construing an act of the 
Legislature, words may be inserted or substituted when necessary to effect the 
manifest intention of the framers thereof” (p. 4).  If we take what the court said in 
those statements, it seems logical that the court would agree with the 
university—that the legislature clearly intended to provide the $500,000 to the 
university, but that the writers who composed the legislation were innocently 
careless with their terminology. 
 However, the court identified another problem with the legislation.  If the 
funds for Lincoln were to be paid from the school fund—even if the 
aforementioned issue with the appropriation was resolved—it would still be 
unconstitutional.  The court argued that the constitution required that any funds 
appropriated for the public school system could be used only for that purpose, 
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with the exception that they could be used to support the University of Missouri.  
The court subsequently ruled that the “Legislature was without power to divert or 
appropriate any portion thereof to any use or purpose other than establishing and 
maintaining the free public schools and the State University…[Lincoln Institute] is 
not a part of the free public school system” (p. 5).  The court clarified that any 
appropriation must be “made out of the general revenue in the State Treasury” 
(p. 5).  In this sense, the court disagreed with the attorney general, who assumed 
that since, “’Lincoln University is a part of the public school system of the State, it 
would seem that the Legislature has the same right to direct the application of a 
portion of the public school funds to its support that it had to direct the application 
of a portion of the same fund to the support of rural high schools’” (p. 4).  As the 
court disagreed with the attorney general’s interpretation of what was considered 
to be part of the free public school system, it ruled that the university was not 
authorized to spend the $500,000.   
 Knowing the auditor’s and court’s true justifications behind their actions is 
difficult.  Certainly, the auditor did not make a decision that is unlike those of 
other state auditors in this study.  The court’s reluctance to enforce the 
legislature’s intent and its ignoring the attorney general’s assumption about 
Lincoln University being a part of the public school system—and thus eligible for 
the appropriation—may lead a researcher to ask if the court was swayed 
exclusively by the law or if its motivation was more sinister.  In other words, did 
the court rule based on legal precedent or based on an animosity toward a 
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historically black institution receiving such a generous appropriation?  It is 
unlikely that this question is answerable.  The benefit of viewing this case in the 
context of other cases is that we see a pattern of state officials questioning 
expenditures, so in this study it does not seem out of the norm.   
Agricultural and Mechanical College v. B.R. Lacy, State Treasurer (130 N.C. 
364, 1902) 
 
 This case involves a state treasurer’s questioning the validity of funding for 
a historically black college.  In 1891, the North Carolina legislature established 
the Agricultural and Mechanical College for the Colored Race.  Between 1891 
and 1902 when the court case occurred, the legislature made regular 
appropriations for the college for construction as well as ongoing maintenance 
and operating costs.  The court considered a challenge by the state treasurer 
who claimed that two separate legislative appropriations were not intended to be 
cumulative but rather that the most recent appropriation cancelled the previous 
appropriation. 
 The legislature passed the initial appropriation mentioned in the case in 
1891:  “’the sum of $2,500 is hereby annually appropriated to the said college, 
and the Treasurer of the State is hereby authorized and directed to pay the said 
amount’” (p. 1).  The legislature, which passed biennial budgets, made $5,000 
appropriations for 1893-94, 1895-96, and 1897-98.  (Court documents do not 
mention 1899-1900, so it is unclear whether this was an omission in court 
records or if the state failed to make an appropriation for that biennium.)  In 1901-
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02, the legislature specified that, “’$5,000 be appropriated to the Colored 
Agricultural and Mechanical College, of Greensboro, for each of the years 1901 
and 1902, in addition to its standing appropriation” (p. 1).  As such, the total 
appropriation for the college for the given years was $2,500 plus $5,000, or a 
total of $7,500. 
 As a basis for this suit, the state treasurer asserted that, “the act of the 
General Assembly passed during its session of 1895 repealed the act of 1891 by 
implication, and that the standing appropriation to the said Agricultural and 
Mechanical College for the Colored Race is only $5,000 per annum” (p. 2).  The 
state treasurer not only wanted to reduce the appropriation to $5,000, but also 
withheld $2,500 of the appropriation because he viewed that his predecessor had 
mistakenly overpaid the college.  Therefore, he planned to pay the college only 
$2,500 of its $5,000 appropriation for 1902. 
 The court closely reviewed the appropriations that had been passed 
during the preceding decade.  It found that the original $2,500 was intended for 
organizational expenses (such as paying to establish the college) and that the 
$5,000 appropriations that followed were for more specific purposes such as 
buildings and maintenance.  Not only were the appropriations intended for 
different purposes, the court also found that the latter act “has no repealing 
clause…If it was the intent of the Legislature…to appropriate $5,000 annually…in 
addition to the amount appropriated in the organic [original] act, then it has done 
so clearly and without doubt.  But if it intended to make this to cover and in 
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substitution for and to repeal the other, then we fail to find any expression or 
suggestion to indicate any intent” (p. 4).  The court considered not only the legal 
basis for the argument, but also considered the practical nature of the 
appropriations:  “The former [the original $2,500] would be totally inadequate to 
meet the future needs of the institution…With this increase of property and 
progress in promoting one of its institutions of learning and usefulness…we 
would not be justified in holding that the Legislature intended to deprive it of that 
sum of money” (pp. 4-5).   
 This case possesses a unique quality among most of the other cases in 
this study—a vigorous dissent in the court opinion.  One justice (with another 
concurring) wrote that “the error in the judgment of the court below is so clear” (p. 
5).  He wrote that the original $2,500 appropriation was intended for start-up 
expenses.  Furthermore, he states, “The law, it is true, does not favor implied 
revocations; but whenever a statute in a different manner makes provision for the 
same thing provided for in a former statute, the former statute is repealed” (p. 5). 
 In this case, the court settled the distribution of power between the 
treasurer and the college—and between the treasurer and legislature, for that 
matter.  It is uncertain whether the college’s role in serving minority students was 
a reason that the treasurer objected to the funding.  While history is full of 
examples of racial strife during this period, it is also a fact that many other 
institutions faced similar questions from state officials.  Although it is impossible 
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to rule out race as a motivator, the context of other cases makes such an 
argument more difficult to make. 
Cincinnati (City) v. Frank J. Jones (16 Ohio Dec. 343, 1905) 
 Cincinnati is a case similar to others in which we see a government official 
challenging the ability of a public university to spend money in a certain way.  
The case highlighted a conflict between the city solicitor who claimed that the 
college was spending taxpayer funds improperly, particularly considering the 
university’s status as a city college.  The court considered issues such as the 
propriety of taxpayer funds being used to construct a president’s home, the use 
of a president’s home, the purpose of a city college, and the standards for its 
management. 
 The University of Cincinnati had a comprehensive mission.  The court 
notes that it had over one thousand students and its departments included “a law 
college, a medical college, an engineering college, and technical school and 
colleges where general academic training is given” and even an athletic field (p. 
2).   
 The university planned to construct a president’s home for several 
reasons:  “’building will be occupied by the president…where he can meet the 
various faculties and committees thereof and directors and other officers of the 
university and the students, and confer with them upon university business and 
affairs, and as a place where college receptions may be held, and for the many 
hospitalities incident to the president’s functions’” (p. 2).  The college also noted 
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that the president’s home being located on campus would be, “’advantageous… 
in order that the students and affairs of the university may at all times be properly 
guided and superintended’” (p. 2).  This logic is relevant even today, and it is 
interesting that even more than a century ago that colleges viewed presidents’ 
responsibilities as not simply the academic management of the institution but 
also student affairs and even fundraising. 
 The city solicitor saw no such advantages and argued much differently.  
He “contends that our university differs from all other American universities, in 
being a municipal university; that as such institution, being part of the 
municipality of Cincinnati, its government and the powers of the city and 
university board pertaining thereto are regulated by statute, and that in the 
construction of the statutes pertaining to such universities…we must apply the 
same rule which is applicable to other municipalities and their institutions” (pp. 4-
5).   The relevant statutes included language that directed a municipal entity to 
levy taxes only to pay for “the chief work of such university, college or institution 
[that involves]…the maintenance of courses of instruction” (p. 5).  In summary, 
the city solicitor viewed the city college as very similar to any other city service 
and thus subject to the same rules and expectations. 
The court faced two issues—did the university’s board control the 
institution’s expenses and was the construction of a president’s home an 
appropriate expense?  The court pointed to the statutes authorizing the 
university’s existence.  That statute outlines that the university’s board of 
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directors “’shall have all the authority, power and control vested in, or belonging 
to…property and funds, given, transferred, covenanted or pledged…[and] may 
provide all the necessary buildings, books, apparatus, means and appliances 
and may be all such by-laws, rules and regulations concerning the president’” 
and other staff (p. 5).  As such, the court ruled that “the scope of the university 
therein described does not differ from that of any other university” (p. 5).  The 
court explained that “the occupation of these houses by the president and 
professors was shown not to have been for the private benefit only of those 
parties but to make it more convenient for the transaction of college business and 
for closer intercourse with the student body” (p. 4). 
 However, the court’s ruling did not rest solely with its legal finding.  After 
all, a court might have read the above legal defense but still deferred to the city 
solicitor’s judgment that using tax revenues to pay for a president’s home was 
just as improper as, for example, building a home of the city’s director of 
maintenance or a city council member.  To justify the construction of a 
president’s home, the court reviewed the history of higher education.  The court 
reflected upon how students lived in the same buildings as their professors and 
staff members during the middle ages.  The court also commented on modern 
European and American universities which “consist of the scholars’ rooms, 
fellows’ rooms, warden’s lodgings, president’s chambers, library, chapel, etc.  
From the beginning, the corporations and the owners of Harvard College have 
considered the college to be a community of teachers and students housed and 
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fed in the college, living in college buildings” (p. 4).  In researching and 
considering these issues, the court took the questions about what powers the 
university should have and diligently researched the topic in its attempt to arrive 
at a fair decision.  As a result of the court’s decision, the university was able to 
construct the president’s home.   
This case differs from many others in this study, as it did not rely on the 
court’s interpretation of a state constitution to help inform its decision.  The court 
considered not only the city statutes but its interpretation of what appeared to be 
in the best interest of the university.  Furthermore, the court’s reliance on the 
history of higher education was a compelling factor in how it crafted its ruling. 
Regents of the State University v. Trapp, Auditor (28 Okla. 83, 1911) and 
Peebly v. Childers, State Auditor (95 Okla. 40, 1923) 
 
 These two cases are discussed concurrently because they are so closely 
related and the details relevant to this study are quite brief.  Despite the brevity, 
the two cases address critical questions of power and to what extent a governor 
has the authority to change an institution’s appropriation after the legislature has 
approved it and when he signs into law other parts of the appropriation. 
In Trapp from 1911, the conflict arose when the university asked the state 
auditor to process payments for a general (and, based on court records, 
noncontroversial) expenditure for the State University at Norman.  The auditor 
refused to pay the expense because “there are not sufficient funds appropriated 
to pay the same” (Trapp, p. 3).  The court could not articulate the auditor’s logic 
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because, quite curiously and without explanation, the auditor failed to provide 
any additional information.  The court explained that the auditor believed he was 
correct in failing to pay the expense because, even though the expense was 
authorized by the legislature and signed by the governor, the governor reduced 
the appropriation upon signing the bill into law.  The court stated that, “It appears 
that the Governor…was of the opinion…that he was authorized thereby not only 
to approve or disapprove any item in toto, but to reduce any item or items to a 
smaller sum than approved by the Legislature” (p. 3).  We might think of this as a 
modern-day line item veto attempt, except that the governor was not vetoing the 
appropriation, but rather attempting to reduce it.  In total, the legislature approved 
$285,810 and the governor attempted to reduce the university’s budget by about 
$94,800, or approximately one-third of the total appropriation.   
 The court’s record does not provide a justification for the governor’s 
actions.  In the governor’s State of the State Address, which was presented to 
the legislature the same month as the court decision, Governor Charles Haskell 
referred to progress being made in higher education.  We may infer that the 
governor was attempting to be thrifty with public funds based on his statement 
that, “the economy of Oklahoma has been the result of curtailing unnecessary 
expenditures, notwithstanding that we have liberally provided for education, 
charity, and beneficial, development” (Haskell, 1911, p. 11).  Court records show 
the details of the governor’s wide-ranging reductions.  For example, he attempted 
to reduce funding for 34 full professors from $55,750 to $48,450.  Likewise, he 
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attempted to reduce funding for 14 associate professors from $19,250 to 
$14,250.  He made similar cuts in many other areas, including the elimination of 
summer school.   
The court ruled that, although it was confused by the governor’s actions, it 
did not have the power to authorize the expenditures that the university sought: 
“since he was without authority thus to approve the bill, his sanction of parts of 
the bill was ineffectual to give those parts the force of a law. Whether, if the 
Governor had understood his powers relative to the bill differently he would have 
approved the whole bill, including those items disapproved by him because in his 
judgment they were excessive, can only be conjectured” (p. 11). 
 In Peebly v. Childers, the set of facts are very similar, although the case 
occurred more than a decade later and with a different governor (J. C. Walton).  
The legislature had passed a $700,000 authorization for the University of 
Oklahoma for 1923-24 and $720,000 for 1924-25, which the governor “after the 
final adjournment of the Legislature drew a line with red ink through each of 
these sums and then wrote…’Approved in the sums of $500,000 only, and 
$500,000 only,’” thus reducing the budget for each year by about 30 percent (p. 
3).  In a brief biography maintained by the University of Oklahoma, it is noted that 
Governor Walton attempted to make political friends and, “To earn patronage 
from conflicting factions [within the legislature], he made appointments to 
positions in state government and higher education.  For example, at the 
University of Oklahoma, Walton sought gubernatorial favors from the Board of 
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Regents, the president and faculty.  Walton sought to reorganize the institution 
on a political basis and pressured University President, Stratton D. Brooks, to 
resign” (University of Oklahoma, n.d., pp. 1-2).  The same article notes that 
Walton was impeached and removed from office in 1923 due to “’illegal collection 
of campaign funds, padding the public payroll, suspension of habeas corpus, 
excessive use of pardon power, and general incompetence’” (p. 3).  It is 
speculative to assume that Walton reduced the appropriation as a political ploy or 
because he was a crook, but it is not an unreasonable speculation. 
 The court ruled—as the Board of Regents requested—that “the action of 
the Governor complained of was unauthorized by the Constitution and the effect 
of such action was to leave the entire sum appropriated by the Legislature for 
salaries and maintenance in full force and effect and available for the payment of 
warrants properly drawn and presented for payment” (p. 3).  The court also 
referred to the governor’s actions as “an unauthorized and futile gesture and 
wholly ineffectual for any purpose” (p. 7).  As such, the funds were reinstated as 
passed by the legislature and the college was able to make payments as it had 
wished. 
 It may be tempting to dismiss these cases as unimportant in the context of 
this study.  After all, the evidence suggests that this conflict resulted (at least in 
part) from a governor who (in Trapp) was incompetent and (in Peebly) was both 
corrupt and incompetent.  Therefore, one may argue that this case is less about 
higher education and more about incompetence or political corruption.  However, 
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the fact remains that these were serious conflicts that highlighted a power 
struggle between the university and the governor (and perhaps between the 
legislature and the governor).  It was the court that settled these important 
disputes.  In Trapp, the court could find no justification to support the college’s 
argument, whereas the court that heard Peebly did so.  This highlights the fact 
that courts can make different rulings when confronted with seemingly 
comparable cases.  For example, in Peebly, a different court (perhaps the one 
that ruled on Trapp) could easily have ruled differently and shifted the power 
back to a governor (Haskell or any future governor).   
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Section 2:  The Power to Manage Land Grant Funds 
 
H. Melgard, Treasurer of the Board of Regents of the University of Idaho, 
Plaintiff v. John W. Eagleson, Treasurer of the State of Idaho, and Clarence 
Van Deusen, Auditor of the State of Idaho, Defendants (31 Idaho 411, 1918) 
 
 Two cases heard by the Supreme Court of Idaho within months of each 
other highlight a university’s concern that state officials were not properly 
handling land grant funds.  As will be noted in many cases, including this one, the 
arrangement that Congress determined would be most efficient in administering 
land grant funds is that each state’s treasurer would be responsible for the 
disbursement of any funds to universities.  In Melgard, the University of Idaho 
challenged how the state treasurer, John Eagleson, treated those funds.   
 The conflict arose after Eagleson deposited $50,000 of land grant income 
into the state’s general fund instead of into a restricted fund that was designated 
for land grant income.  Only funds from the restricted account were guaranteed 
to be directed into the University of Idaho’s coffers.  Furthermore, Eagleson 
refused to disburse the $50,000 to the University.  The University complained 
that the treasurer had misdirected the funds into the general fund, that he refused 
to pay the funds to the University as directed by law, and that the treasurer 
endangered future receipt of federal funds because the University would be 
unable to report to the federal government how the federal funds were being 
handled. 
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 The court’s brief opinion states unequivocally that Eagleson lacked the 
power to deposit the grant funds into the state’s general fund nor could he 
withhold the funds from the university.  The court described the treasurer’s role 
as follows:  “the state treasurer, to whom the fund is transmitted by the Secretary 
of the Treasury, has, with reference to this fund, a mere clerical or ministerial 
duty to perform, that is, to pay over the fund immediately to the treasurer of the 
board of trustees, in this case the board of regents, upon their order” (p. 3).  The 
court further clarified that “the state auditor has no duty whatever to perform with 
respect to this fund and no authority over it” (p. 3). 
 Eagleson’s motives are not explicitly stated, but he directed $50,000 in 
land grant funds to be deposited into the state’s general fund rather than in a 
restricted account as required by the state constitution.  Court documents do not 
always reveal the motivations behind why a person makes a certain choice.  As 
such, we do not know why Eagleson took this action.  Was Eagleson attempting 
to exert control over a state university, or to improve the state’s own finances by 
funneling land grant funds into the state’s general fund?  The answer to those 
questions is unclear.  The implications of the case are evident, however.  By 
declaring that a state treasurer and auditor have “clerical or ministerial” duties 
regarding these funds, the court declared them to be nearly powerless in matters 
regarding the distribution of land grant funds.  If the court had decided differently, 
or at least had not been so clear that the treasurer and auditor were without 
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significant power, higher education in Idaho—particularly for the land grant 
institutions—could have been constrained financially. 
Evan Evans et al., as State Board of Education and Board of Regents of the 
University of Idaho, Plaintiffs v. Clarence Van Deusen, Auditor, and John 
W. Eagleson, Treasurer, of the State of Idaho, Defendants (31 Idaho 614, 
1918) 
 
 Although this case appears initially to be a victory for the state auditor and 
treasurer, the decision—although not a technical win for the university—clarified 
policies that ultimately protected the university from state interference.  This case 
addressed an issue very similar to what we saw in Melgard, which was decided 
only a few months earlier.  Perhaps still skeptical that the state treasurer and 
auditor would handle land grant funds properly, the University of Idaho again 
sued both officials because the university argued that land grant funds were 
being deposited into the state’s general fund. 
 The auditor explained to the court—to the court’s satisfaction—that the 
funds were indeed not being designated as general fund monies.  The auditor’s 
explanation is highly technical and the details are not relevant to the scope of this 
study.  In summary, the auditor used the general fund as a temporary holding 
place until the grant funds could be transferred to a proper restricted fund.  One 
might consider this to be a victory for the auditor and treasurer.  After all, the 
court endorsed their method of accounting for the land grant funds.  However, we 
must keep in mind several factors.  First, we know from the Melgard case that the 
court viewed the auditor’s role as clerical and ministerial.  Therefore, even with 
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this ruling that endorsed the auditor’s accounting tactics, one should not have 
expected the auditor and treasurer to have gained significant power in the 
management of these funds.  But, the court went a step further in Evans and 
clarified how the funds must be managed:  “it was expressly indicated that these 
funds are not a part of the appropriation made by the act.  Nowhere in the act is 
there any provision that funds belonging to the various institutions…shall be 
transferred to any other fund in the treasury” (p. 4).   
 The case’s result is not inconsistent with the victory that the university 
enjoyed with Melgard.  The court, although it permitted the accounting 
maneuvers that the university found unpalatable, affirmed that the land grant 
funds belonged to the university and that the auditor and treasurer were 
performing clerical duties in managing them.  Furthermore, the court clarified that 
even if the funds were erroneously placed into the state’s general fund, they were 
still not subject to appropriation and legislative interference. 
State Ex Rel. Koch, Relator v. Barret, State Treasurer, Respondent (26 
Mont. 62, 1901) 
 
 This case reveals a power struggle between the state board of education 
and the state treasurer and attorney general.  The state treasurer and attorney 
general not only argued that the state board of education lacked the power to 
spend money and questioned how the money was spent, but they also raised a 
critical question about how the land grant funds were generated such that—if 
  
 
60 
 
they had succeeded—would have derailed the federal land grant funding system 
in Montana. 
 The case originated after the state treasurer refused to pay a $1,500 
expenditure that was funded by land grant revenues.  The treasurer outlined 
three arguments regarding why the board was not eligible to claim the funds.  
The first is that “’the legislature of the state of Montana has not appropriated the 
sum demanded’…and ‘that there is no law authorizing the payment to the relator 
of moneys derived from the leasing of lands donated to the state’” (p. 3).  This is 
similar to arguments we see in several other cases—that is, the idea that state 
institutions could only expend funds that the legislature specifically appropriated.  
The treasurer relied upon the land grant’s stipulation that the funds would be 
allocated “in such a manner as the legislatures of states may prescribe” (p. 4).  
The court found, however, that this language did not imply that the legislature 
must appropriate the funds.  The state constitution established a “’state board of 
education…[that would receive] from the government of the United States, any 
and all funds, incomes, or other property to which any of the said institutions may 
be entitled, and to use and appropriate the same’” (p. 4).  Therefore, the court 
ruled that there were sufficient mechanisms in place to ensure that funds were 
being spent in accordance with federal and state constitutional guidelines and 
without the legislature needing to be involved. 
 The treasurer’s second argument is “that the claim for which the warrant 
was drawn is a claim against the state other than for a salary of compensation of 
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a public officer, and should be audited and allowed by the state board of 
examiners and paid upon the warrant of the state auditor” (p. 4).  The court 
clarified that the land grant funds constituted a trust and that, as such, the 
expenses were drawn upon the trust rather than acting expenses of the state.  
Therefore, they were not subject to the same level of auditor review as an 
ordinary state expenditure.  The court further clarified the role of the board of 
education by stating that Congress “intended that this board should be clothed 
with the special and exclusive power of executing it free from the limitations and 
restrictions of the constitution as to the expenditure of ordinary revenues from the 
state.  It may be that a different rule would apply to expenditures of any moneys 
appropriated by the legislature out of the revenues of the state to supplement the 
revenues derived from the trust fund thus left to the control of the board” (p. 5).  
With this language, the court went beyond the scope of this one question by 
ruling that no land grant proceeds were subject to state oversight and delineated 
and differences between federal and state funds. 
 The final argument that the court addressed is the most unusual—and the 
most important among the three issues that it considered.  Based on what we 
have seen in other cases, the process of receiving land grant revenues involved 
Congress allocating the land, the state selling the land, and then the funds being 
deposited into an institution’s permanent endowment fund.  This happened in 
Montana as well but with one critical exception.  Instead of selling the land, the 
land was typically leased.  The lease income provided revenue which was 
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deposited into the permanent fund, but the treasurer objected to the fact that it 
did not constitute a sale of land:  “the attorney general argued that congress, in 
making the grant, intended that it should become available only after a sale of the 
lands granted, and an investment of the moneys thus obtained, so as to provide 
an income from interest” (p. 5).  The court noted that most of the revenues were 
derived from leases, so if a university could not benefit from lease income, the 
result could have been devastating.  The court interpreted Congress’ wishes 
more loosely than the attorney general, however.  “We think the manifest 
intention of congress was to create a permanent endowment…and to require that 
the revenues derived therefrom should be faithfully applied to the support of the 
institutions created…So long as this intention is carried out, we think it makes no 
difference what mode is adopted.  The grant was made in view of conditions 
existing at the time, and others which might arise” (p. 5).  Addressing the specific 
topic of leasing, the court said, “It certainly could not have been intended that 
lands which could not be readily and speedily sold, but which…could be made to 
yield a revenue by a system of leasing, should be allowed to lie idle and 
unprofitable until such time as the state could sell them, and thus comply with the 
strict letter of the grant” (p. 5). 
This case’s outcome was important for public higher education in 
Montana.  That a treasurer and attorney general would challenge the board of 
education’s ability to raise money through land grant funds, that they would argue 
that the legislature must appropriate any expenditures, and would contend that 
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the treasurer must audit expenditures demonstrates a clear rift between the 
universities and state officials.  For each element of the conflict, the court ruled in 
the board’s favor, even admitting that it was unnecessary to “comply with the 
strict letter of the grant” (p. 5).  The court’s findings, particularly related to its 
comfort with not adhering to the “strict letter” of Congress’ land grant 
requirements, demonstrates a clear deference to the universities, permitting them 
much broader power than the treasurer and attorney general argued that they 
should have.   
State Ex Rel. Haire, Relator v. Rice, as State Treasurer, Respondent (33 
Mont. 365, 1906) and Montana ex rel. Haire v. Rice, State Treasurer (204 
U.S. 291, 1907) 
 
 These cases are discussed together, as the latter case represents an 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1907 from a Montana Supreme Court ruling 
in 1906.  At issue is a law that the Montana legislature passed in 1905—“An Act 
to enable the Normal School Land Grant to be further utilized in providing 
Additional Buildings and Equipment for the Montana State Normal College” (p. 
8).  As the act’s title suggests, the legislature proposed to use lands sold as a 
result of the federal Enabling Act as a way to help provide bond funding for 
buildings and equipment at the state’s normal school:  “The funds realized from 
the sale or leasing of the lands granted by the United States to Montana for State 
Normal School purposes (100,000 acres), and the licenses received from permits 
to cut timber on any of said lands, are pledged as security for the payment of the 
principal and interest on such bonds, except such sums as may be necessary to 
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pay other bonds heretofore issued” (p. 8).  As discussed in other cases in this 
study, the Enabling Act was a federal act that Congress passed that allowed 
states to sell or lease lands in order to generate revenue to help fund educational 
enterprises in their respective states.  Congress charged the states to develop 
regulations for the expenditure of those revenues in their constitutions, but was 
not prescriptive regarding the method for how lands would be sold nor the use of 
the funds.  In compliance with the Enabling Act, the Montana state constitution 
outlined the use of any resulting funds: “’The various funds shall be respectively 
invested under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and shall forever 
remain inviolate and sacred to the purpose for which they were dedicated…The 
interest of said invested funds, together with the rents from leased lands or 
properties, shall be devoted to the maintenance and perpetuation of these 
respective institutions’” (p. 9).   
 Due to the apparent conflict between the Montana constitution (which 
required that any revenues be invested into permanent endowment funds) and 
the legislative act (which allowed funds to be used to pay for construction-related 
bonds), the state treasurer refused to pay a bill from an architect who was 
working on a construction project at the state university. The treasurer contended 
that the state constitution’s word on the matter was final—that is, that funds must 
be invested in the university’s permanent endowment fund.  The university 
argued that the Enabling Act offered the legislature latitude to spend the money 
as it saw fit, and also supported its argument by stressing the ambiguity in the 
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state’s constitution which outlined that funds could be expended as “prescribed 
by law” (p. 9).  In other words, the university contended that the legislature simply 
prescribed the law that the constitution allowed it to prescribe. 
 The court ruled that, despite the apparent ambiguity, it was the 
constitution’s intent that should be given the greatest consideration.  The court 
chided the legislature for attempting to take the lands from the state and give 
them to the legislature:  “The lands were granted to the state of Montana, not to 
the Legislative Assembly.  The legislature may say how the lands shall be held; 
but it is the state which holds them, which has title to them. It is the state which 
says what shall be done with the lands…The state may act through its 
constitutional convention, and, if it does so, such action is conclusive. In the 
absence of constitutional provision, it may act through its legislative assembly” 
(p. 10).  The court admitted that the constitution provided the legislature the 
ability to make regulations, but those regulations could not overrule the intent of 
the constitution which was to ensure that the revenues were deposited into the 
permanent endowment.   
 The legislature and the normal school were undeterred by the state 
supreme court ruling above.  In early 1907, they argued the case at the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court considered many of the arguments above 
and they do not bear repeating.  The justices found that the Enabling Act 
authorized—and required—the state to hold a constitutional convention.  The 
convention was charged with making two important decisions relevant to this 
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case: the constitutional convention established a legislature and it established 
regulations regarding the sale of the lands at issue.  The court declared that, “the 
natural inference is that Congress, in designating the legislature as the agency to 
deal with the lands, intended such a legislature as would be established by the 
constitution of the State…It follows, therefore, that in executing the authority 
entrusted to it by Congress the legislature must act in subordination to the state 
constitution, and we think that in so holding the Supreme Court of the State 
committed no error” (p. 7).  The Supreme Court—as was the case for several 
other state courts and decisions cited in this study—had greater faith in the 
continuity of the state constitution than in the legislature, given that it was subject 
to political pressures and its members’ whims.  This case therefore clarified that 
the legislature lacked the power to change the use of land grant funds.  As a 
result, the college’s flexibility with spending the funds was significantly inhibited. 
State, Ex. Rel. Spencer Lens Company, Relator, v. Edwin M. Searle, Jr., 
Auditor, Respondent (77 Neb. 155, 1906) 
 
 Spencer addresses whether the legislature should appropriate funds that 
had federal origins.  Beginning in 1887, the United States Congress authorized 
$15,000 per year to be given to the University of Nebraska “for the purpose of 
carrying on experimental work in agriculture” (p. 1).  From 1887 to 1899, the 
federal government disbursed the funds directly to the university.  In 1899, the 
state legislature passed a law that specified that the state treasurer would be the 
custodian of university funds.  Funds continued to be funneled to the university 
  
 
67 
 
(from the federal treasury to the state treasury and then to the university) without 
incident until 1906, when the state auditor refused to authorize a payment for the 
university’s agricultural station.  The state auditor argued that, “the legislature 
had not specifically appropriated the fund in question for that purpose” (p. 2).  In 
other words, the auditor was willing to authorize expenditures only with legislative 
approval, regardless of whether the funds came from the state, the federal 
government, or some other source. 
 The auditor declared that the statute that prescribed him the power to 
control university expenditures was the same statute that had designated the 
state treasurer as the custodian of university funds.  The law outlined that “the 
fund having been paid to the state treasurer, it cannot be expended by the board 
without a specific appropriation thereof by the legislature” (p. 2).  The auditor 
noted that courts had held in similar cases not involving higher education that, 
indeed, state agencies could spend funds only following legislative authorization.  
The court considered this argument but ruled that the university—not the auditor 
or treasurer—retained the power to execute the expenditures.  The court 
articulated two arguments.  First, the court relied on the state constitution, which 
stated that “’lands, money, or other property granted, or bequeathed to this state 
in educational purposes, shall be used and expended in accordance with the 
terms of such grant, bequest, or conveyance’” and that the “board of regents not 
only has the power to accept the fund in question, but it is also its duty to do so 
and to expend it for the purposes declared by the acts of congress” (p. 2).  The 
  
 
68 
 
federal government had provided these funds to the university, and it was 
therefore within the university’s purview to spend those funds according to the 
federal government’s guidelines.  With its ruling, the court clarified that the 
regents and the university—not the state auditor or the legislature—had the 
power to decide how to spend outside grant funds.   
Second, the court clarified that Congress’ funds for the agricultural station 
were never the property of the state at all:  “[the property] never belonged to the 
state.  It was donated by the United States to the experiment station of the 
university for a specific purpose…It never was, and is not now, any part of the 
funds of the state” (p. 2).  This ruling’s implication is that the state had no 
constitutional justification to interfere in these matters, nor did the court feel that 
the state even had a property interest because the money came from a source 
outside of the state treasury.   
Although the court’s decision was relatively brief, its implications are 
compelling.  The court deferred to the university regents and clarified the powers 
given to them by the state constitution.  This case’s attention-grabbing element is 
how the court viewed federal funds.  Due to federal legislation that established 
funding for projects such as Nebraska’s agricultural station, significant sums of 
money were being funneled from the federal treasury to states universities.  With 
its ruling, the court established that the state had little or no power the dictate the 
expenditure of those plentiful federal funds.  The university was accountable and 
had to answer to the federal treasury and to Congress—not the state legislature 
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or state elected/appointed officials.  The court’s ruling ostensibly allowed the 
university to function outside of the realm of state control and oversight when 
federal funds were involved.  This case not only addressed the balance of power 
between the state and university, but also clarified the distribution of power 
among Congress, the state, and the university.   
Regents of University of New Mexico v. Graham, State Treasurer, et al. (33 
N.M. 214, 1928) 
 
 At issue in this case is Congress’ intent regarding how land grant funds 
were to be allocated to the University of New Mexico.  A disagreement ensued 
when the state treasurer, state auditor, and state commissioner of public lands 
challenged the university’s plan to use certain oil drilling royalties to pay general 
university budget obligations rather than being invested into the institution’s 
permanent endowment.  The university justified this plan based on an act passed 
by the state legislature, so the treasurer, auditor, and commissioner challenged 
how both the university and the legislature wished to process the royalties. 
 The specifics of the case address the differences between the Ferguson 
Act and the Enabling Act.  The Ferguson Act, passed by Congress in 1898, 
provided 65,000 acres of land for the University of New Mexico and 100,000 
acres for an agricultural college.  With this act, lands belonging to the university 
could only be leased rather than sold.  Congress further stipulated that any funds 
deriving from such leases or from products such as oil “shall constitute 
permanent funds, to be safely invested, and the income thereof to be used 
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exclusively for the purposes of such University and Agricultural College” (p. 4).  
The Enabling Act, which Congress passed in 1910, provided 200,000 acres to 
the University of New Mexico.  However, the language in the latter Enabling Act 
was vague compared to the Ferguson Act.  The Enabling Act allowed that the 
grant to be used “’for University purposes’” (p. 3).  Since the Enabling Act 
appeared to permit the funds to be directed into accounts that were not 
permanent endowment accounts, the legislature felt justified in prescribing that 
the funds be used in that way.  In 1917, the legislature passed a law that stated, 
“The permanent funds created by this act shall consist of the proceeds of sales of 
lands…and the income and current funds created by this act shall consist of 
rentals, sale of products from lands, interest on permanent funds, and anything 
else other than money directly derived from sale of all state lands so granted” (p. 
4).  It is important to note that the “act” referred to above actually refers to both 
the Ferguson and Enabling Acts—that is, the legislature designed the law so that 
the apparent flexibility afforded by the Enabling Act could be applied to the 
Ferguson Act.  The legislature reasoned that the Ferguson Act’s requirement that 
funds be placed into a permanent endowment was overridden by the Enabling 
Act.  
 The university was understandably content to follow the legislature’s 
direction.  Although the court documents do not specify the amount of money that 
was at stake, we can assume that the amount of oil royalties from 100,000 acres 
was substantial—or at least had the potential to be.  The objection raised by the 
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aforementioned state officials indicates that, between the act’s passage in 1917 
and June 1925, the royalties were indeed deposited into general income funds 
with the university as the legislature directed.  But, beginning in June 1925, state 
officials directed the royalties into the college’s permanent endowment fund.  The 
central question that the court considered was, “Was it competent for the 
Legislature to direct the placing of oil royalties in the income fund?” (p. 4). 
 The legal arguments each side presented are straightforward.  The 
university argued that “there is nothing in…the Enabling Act fairly to indicate that 
Congress intended to restrict the right of the Legislature to adopt such policy as it 
might see fit with reference to the proceeds from the lands granted; that it was 
entirely competent for the Legislature to establish or not to establish an 
endowment” (p. 5).  Furthermore, the university reasoned that it would have been 
illogical for Congress to have established similar land grant programs, with one 
restricting revenues to be deposited into a permanent fund while the other 
prescribing lax restrictions.  Therefore, the university pushed for the looser 
restrictions outlined by the Enabling Act to be those that guided policy. 
 The treasurer, auditor, and commissioner of public lands disagreed with 
this interpretation, and it was an opinion that the court supported. Regarding the 
notion that the Enabling Act cancelled the permanent endowment provisions set 
forth in the Ferguson Act, the court rejected the argument:  “The later [act] is 
additional and supplemental.  In the earlier [act] Congress had plainly pursued its 
historic policy of endowing Universities and Agricultural Colleges.  Having once 
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expressed that purpose, it was deemed unnecessary to reiterate it…Of course, 
Congress could have reversed such policy.  But it did not” (p. 7).  But, the court 
did not stop with this ruling.  It also declared that the Ferguson and Enabling Acts 
were so intertwined that they must be considered together.  In doing so, the court 
found that even funds deriving from the Enabling Act—which Congress had not 
technically designated as creating a permanent fund—must still be invested into 
the university’s endowment.  Therefore, all of the revenues associated with these 
two acts were ordered to be directed into the university’s permanent endowment 
fund. 
 Just as we see in some of the other cases, the court provided a 
justification for its actions beyond simply the legalities, explaining that, “It 
[Congress] declared an enforceable trust, realizing that the new state might not 
be willing patiently to await the growth of its University endowment, but might be 
tempted by present needs to dissipate its patrimony” (p. 7).  What are we to 
make of this comment?  The court was clearly attempting to ensure that federal 
resources were used appropriately, but it also demonstrated a keen awareness 
of the importance of long-term resources.  Although we can speculate that courts 
were slightly more trusting of universities to make good decisions about 
resources than they were of state legislatures, there is nonetheless a skepticism 
that is apparent in this and other cases.  The court articulated that there needed 
to be legal mechanisms in place to protect universities from focusing on short-
term needs and wants rather than their long-term viability.  
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State Ex Rel Board of University and School Lands v. McMillan, State 
Treasurer (120 N.D. 280, 1903) 
 
 This case addressed the question of whether a university’s board could 
make policies that circumvented the intent of federal regulations regarding the 
use of land grant proceeds.  The conflict arose following the refusal by D. H. 
McMillan, North Dakota’s state treasurer, to allow the university to invest $60,000 
of land grant proceeds in bond funds. The bonds were issued by Valley City 
College, a public university.  The university’s plan involved purchasing its own 
bonds with its endowment, which was no doubt a creative attempt to circumvent 
the requirement that land grant funds be invested in permanent endowment 
funds. 
 The case’s importance centers on two issues.  The first is whether the 
university’s board had the power to invest the permanent endowment fund as it 
saw fit or if that decision was subject to legislative control.  Second, if the board 
was required to seek legislative approval, would the purchase of bonds meet the 
requirement that an investment of the permanent endowment fund be safe and 
prudent? 
 The North Dakota constitution stipulated that, “the legislative assembly 
shall pass suitable laws for the safe keeping, transfer and disbursement of the 
State of North Dakota school funds” (p. 3).  The state constitution further defines 
the investment of funds:  “the moneys of the permanent school fund and other 
educational funds shall be invested only in bonds of school corporations within 
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the State of North Dakota, bonds of the United States, bonds of the state of North 
Dakota, or in first mortgages on farm lands in the state” (p. 3).  The state 
treasurer argued that the plan for a university to purchase its own bonds using its 
endowment fund was unconstitutional:  his “refusal to pay is based entirely upon 
the contention that the board is without legal authority to invest this fund in the 
kinds of obligations proposed as an investment” (p. 7). 
 The constitutional limitation on the types of investments that a college may 
make is interesting and reflects a conservative investment strategy.  The court 
probed the university about the bond’s riskiness, indicating that it was concerned 
about the bond’s riskiness:  “Defendant [the board] alleges that he has no 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief whether the interest and 
income accumulating from the sale, rental, or lease of the Valley City Normal 
School lands will continually increase, or as to whether said interest and income 
would be adequate to the payment of the interest on said bonds at all times, or 
whether said interest and income will be sufficient to provide a sinking fund for 
the payment of the principal at maturity” (p. 8).  The court expressed concern 
about Congress’ intentions with the land grant funds, stating that, “By the mere 
acceptance of the grant the honor of the state was pledged to the observance of 
the obligation of the trust; that is, to maintain the permanency of the trust fund 
and to use the interest thereof” (p. 11).   
 One might assume that the university’s bonds could be considered the 
bond of a school corporation (an investment permitted by the state constitution), 
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but the court clarified that normal school bonds are not school corporation bonds.  
The court considered whether the college’s bonds are bonds of the state (and 
thus eligible for purchase) as the case’s “decisive question” (p. 13).  Curiously, 
the court answered that the bonds are bonds of the state.  Unfortunately for the 
university’s board, however, classifying the bonds as a state bond violated the 
constitution in a different way—this time, because the issuance of the bonds 
would violate the state’s debt limit. 
 The court’s ruling acknowledged the difficulties facing higher education 
and universities’ access to funding and the broader implications of the decision:  
“The members of this court are not unmindful of the embarrassment to this and 
other state institutions which are looking to moneys derived from these proposed 
loans for buildings and improvements which will follow our decision.  This will be 
temporary, however, and is of small consequence compared to the permanent 
injury which would be done to the people of the state if the courts…should fail in 
the performance of their duty” (p. 20).  The court thus echoed a theme that we 
see in other cases—the court was very hesitant to endorse policies that 
endangered the long-term viability of universities, and courts consistently viewed 
having a stable endowment as an indicator of that long-term health.  
 It may be tempting to describe this case as one that primarily addressed 
the nuances of constitutional law, bond requirements, and accounting rules.  
Although the case certainly contains those elements, the implications are broader 
than that.  The court even acknowledged such in their closing comments in the 
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previous paragraph.  This case tells the story of how colleges were engaged in 
very creative activities—perhaps even desperate ones—to help literally build the 
institutions that they wanted to create, expand, or improve.  There is nothing in 
the case that demonstrates that the court—or even the treasurer, for that 
matter—was angered by these efforts.  In fact, we see a court struggling to make 
the correct decision and expressed guilt because its decision was not one that 
the university’s board wanted.   
 Another compelling element of this story relates to how conservatively 
permanent endowment funds were invested.  At least in North Dakota, this was 
not a state that gambled with its institutions’ endowments.  Regardless of the 
motivation, the courts and many state officials were concerned about the 
permanency of endowment funds.  We can assume that this reflects not only the 
seriousness with which these officials performed their duties but also the 
appreciation that they had regarding the adequate long-term preservation of 
funds. 
State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candland et al., State Board of Land 
Commissioners (36 Utah 406, 1909) 
 
 In this case, the University of Utah and the Utah legislature were aligned 
with each other.  It was the state attorney-general that objected to an agreement 
regarding how land grant funds should be expended.  In the state’s constitution, 
the court noted the relevant language regarding how land grant funds should be 
accounted for and expended:  “’the proceeds of the sale of said lands, or any 
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portion thereof, should constitute permanent funds to be safely invested and held 
by said state, and the income thereof to be used exclusively for the purposes of 
such university’” (p. 9).  The University of Utah is mentioned in the 1894 
constitution, and is referred to as part of “’the public school system’” and that land 
grant funds “shall be used exclusively for the support and maintenance of the 
different institutions…in accordance with the requirements and conditions of said 
acts of Congress” (p. 9).  The requirements outlined in Utah’s constitution are 
very similar to those found in other states included in this study.   
 In 1909, the state legislature passed a law that allowed the State Board of 
Land Commissioners—which oversaw the sales of land for university land grant 
purposes—to lend $250,000 from the land grant fund to the University of Utah for 
the construction of a building.  The law outlined that the university would then pay 
back the fund using revenues from additional land grant sales.  The attorney 
general sued, arguing that the law was unconstitutional and that it did not meet 
the guidelines that Congress and the state agreed upon.  The court considered 
three key issues:  whether the law authorizing the use of land grant funds for the 
building construction was appropriate, the definition of an “investment” (which is 
closely related to the first issue), and whether the university is equipped to act as 
a public entity or as a separate corporation.  A further complication is that the 
state’s constitution only permitted the state to go into debt a maximum of 
$200,000 for general obligation bonds.  If the court decided that the loan from the 
land grant fund to the university was unconstitutional and thus was an obligation 
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of the state—rather than of the university—then the act would be unconstitutional 
because of the state’s aggregate debt limit requirement.   
 Given the clear language in the state’s constitution prohibiting the 
proposed use of land grant funds, how did the legislature and the university 
justify their plan to use land grant funds for construction?  First, the university 
contended that it was a “corporation existing as such under the laws of the 
state…[and] legally competent to enter into contracts and to incur debts” (p. 9).  
As an independent corporation, the university could not only retain the power to 
incur debts, but also would not have the state’s debt limit requirement as a 
potential burden.  Second, the university argued that loan of $250,000 from the 
land grant fund constituted an investment not unlike how endowment funds 
would be deposited into any other type of investment instrument.  If the land 
grant act was, as described, “created for its [the university’s] use and benefit,” 
then it stands to reason that such a loan satisfies the investment requirement (p. 
9).  Third, the university argued that, “in order to declare a legislative act void 
upon the ground that it is in conflict with the Constitution, such conflict must be 
very clear” (p. 10).  In other words, the university argued that the court must 
satisfy a very high standard before voiding the act that gave it the power to 
receive the loan. 
 The first two arguments are particularly important to higher education.  
The notion that a state university could act as an independent corporation in Utah 
may have drastically changed the relationship between the state and the public 
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university system.  In responding to this argument, the court dismissed the idea:  
“The university is a state institution…since the members constituting its 
governing board are all appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate, 
and the board regularly reports to the governor.  Moreover, the corporation holds 
all the property in trust merely.  In fact the property belongs to the State of Utah.  
We think no one will seriously contend that the corporation styled the ‘University 
of Utah’ has the power or authority, without the consent of the State of Utah, to 
dispose of any property” (p. 11).  The court was also concerned by what would 
happen if the university failed or if its property were wiped out:  “The real 
ownership is thus the state, and if the university property is destroyed from any 
cause it is the loss of the state, and the burden of restoring it must, as it should, 
fall upon the state at large” (p. 11). 
 Regarding the second argument, the court argued that university’s plan to 
use land grant funds as a loan was a clear constitutional violation.  Although the 
university contended that the loan for a building constituted an investment just as 
one might invest endowment funds in stocks, bonds, or similar instruments, the 
court was unconvinced, holding that land grant funds “shall constitute a 
permanent school fund, the interest of which only shall be expended for the 
support of said schools” (p. 9).  In other words, the constitution’s language and 
purpose were both clear. 
We see again a court that is encouraging a great deal of restraint in the 
use of these land grant funds, and it did not accept the creative ways in which the 
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university wished to circumvent legal requirements.  The court’s ruling effectively 
declared that land grant funds were conservatively restricted only to investments 
as outlined by the state constitution, which meant that Utah’s plans to expedite 
the construction of buildings were quashed. 
The State of Washington on the Relation of Arthur W. Davis, et al., Plaintiff, 
v. C. W. Clausen, as State Auditor, Respondent (160 Wash. 618, 1931) 
 
 This case is unusual in that it concurrently addresses how a college may 
access both state and federal funds.  The conflict began when the state auditor 
refused to pay expenses to the State College of Washington because the funds 
had not been appropriated by the legislature.  The funds involved two state funds 
and three federal funds—Morrill, Hatch, and Smith-Lever.   
 The court considered the two types of funds separately.  The state funds 
involved the college’s collection of fees from students that are outside of the 
typical collection of tuition, “including class room fees, dormitory rental, summer 
school tuition, and money derived from the sale of live stock dairy products, etc.” 
(p. 3).  One might assume that these funds would have attracted low levels of 
controversy, as they were designed to cover specific expenses that the university 
incurred.  The treasurer saw the issue differently.  Regarding these revenues—
which were deposited with the state treasurer—the treasurer “bases his 
refusal…upon the ground that there are no legislative appropriations covering the 
same, and that, for this reason, no lawful authority exists which justifies him in 
issuing the warrants” (p. 3).  The treasurer pointed to language in the state 
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constitution that stated, “’No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this 
state, or any of its funds, or any of the funds under its management, except in 
pursuance of an appropriation by law’” (p. 4).  Therefore, he argued that the 
college indeed possessed the power to collect the revenues and to deposit them 
with his office, but that the college lacked the power to follow through and then 
spend the money. 
 The court considered several earlier cases that related to the expenditures 
of funds held by the treasurer, and found that, “Money which the law directs shall 
be paid to the state treasurer, is received by him as such, and must be 
accounted for by him in that capacity…money paid thereunder to the state 
treasurer…cannot be disbursed, save pursuant to some lawful appropriation by 
the state legislature, and within the period limited by law” (p. 5).  The court 
interpreted the constitution and statutes very strictly.  By viewing the fee charges 
as revenues to the state and not distinguishable from any other revenues, 
whether property taxes or income taxes, the court significantly curtailed the 
power that a college had to exercise discretion regarding how it expended those 
revenues. 
 One might assume that the court would necessarily view the handling of 
federal funds for the Morril, Hatch, and Smith-Lever funds differently from state 
funds.  After all, these were external funds that other state courts cited in this 
study found should expended at the primary or sole discretion of the recipient 
college.  The Washington Supreme Court disagreed.  The court noted that, when 
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the legislature initially approved the receipt of federal funds from Congress, it set 
up special accounts into which the land grant proceeds would flow.  Furthermore, 
the court noted that “it is interesting to observe that the legislature, after 
establishing these funds, has always made specific biennial appropriations 
therefrom…thereby indicating that, as to these funds, the legislature deemed 
regular appropriations necessary to withdraw moneys therefrom” (p. 6).  Indeed, 
the court relied on legislature’s consistent appropriation of federal funds to the 
college as a precedent that the legislature intended for the funds to be treated as 
such.   
The college countered that the funds were clearly accepted from the 
federal government in order to establish a college, and that the college must by 
necessity be granted the power to manage the funds within its purview.  One of 
the court’s key sources of logic is that the power to manage funds should rest 
with the legislature because the legislature had been a trusted source of 
management in the past.  The court said it might have felt differently “if the 
legislature was endeavoring to divert from the use of the college any of the funds 
with which we are here concerned,” but it found no evidence of such activity (p. 
8).   
 Curiously, the court admitted with federal Hatch Act funds that the funds 
“may be…handled without the intervention of any state officer, other than the 
board of regents.  Money to be paid by the government under this act, need not 
be paid to the state treasurer, but, if paid to him, should be appropriated by the 
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legislature as other funds so paid to that officer” (p. 8).  With this logic, the court 
ruled that the legislature, not the college, had the power to appropriate funds and 
that the college was subject to legislative discretion with such appropriations. 
Although the case’s facts differ from other court cases, the Washington 
Supreme Court arrived at a much different conclusion than other courts in this 
study.  The court viewed the legislature as an ally that could assist the university 
and could be trusted rather than an adversary.  This was unusual.  The court’s 
deference of power to the legislature and appropriations was also highly unusual 
given the outcomes of other court cases in this study.   
Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Agricultural College v. Irvine, Treasurer of the 
State of Wyoming (206 U.S. 278, 1907)  
 
 Wyoming is a case that the U.S. Supreme Court heard following an appeal 
after the Wyoming State Supreme Court ruled.  This case’s central issue—and is 
one that was not only important to the state of Wyoming but also to all land grant 
colleges and states in which they were located—is whether Congress’ land grant 
funds were allocated to the states or to individual colleges.  Put differently, was it 
the state legislature or the individual college that determined the expenditure of 
the funds?  These are important questions and are ones that other courts in other 
states heard.  However, this case possessed an unusual twist.  Wyoming 
Agricultural College viewed itself as the sole beneficiary of land grant funds that 
were being funneled from Congress to the states.  Presumably, it made this 
argument—that it controlled its funds, not the state—in order to help promote its 
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survival, as the state legislature had voted to revoke the institution’s charter and 
reallocate the land grant funds (as well as other funds, no doubt) to the University 
of Wyoming.  Wyoming Agricultural College objected, arguing that only their 
institution was entitled to the funds.   
 Whether the college’s argument regarding this matter was a desperate 
effort to save itself is unclear, although we can surmise that they made the most 
compelling political and legal arguments possible.  That the case made it to the 
U.S. Supreme Court suggests that the court viewed this as a compelling and 
unanswered question.  The court reflected upon Congress’ language in the land 
grant legislation, and found that “It is so obvious that these appropriations are 
made to the State and not to any institutions within the State, and that the States, 
acting through their legislatures, are to expend the appropriations in accordance 
with the trust imposed upon them” (p. 5). 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling had important implications for the 
balance of power between the states and colleges, but the state supreme court’s 
case considered other important matters that, although were confined to 
Wyoming, were critical to the development of higher education in the state.   
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Section 3:  The Power to Control the University 
 
The State of Florida, by W. H. Ellis, Attorney-General of Said State Upon the 
Relation of F. B. Moodie, Fred L. Stringer, A Trustee of the University of 
Florida, and the City of Lake City, a Municipal Corporation, Relator, v. N.P. 
Bryan, A.L. Brown, Nathaniel Adams, P.K. Yonge, and T.B. King as the 
State Board of Control, Respondents (50 Fla. 293, 1905) 
 
 Out of all cases selected for this study, this case from the Florida Supreme 
Court highlighted a conflict that had the most dramatic of consequences—the 
closure of several public universities.  In 1905, the state legislature enacted a law 
that began with “An act to abolish” and went on to list several institutions:  the 
University of Florida, West Florida Seminary, White Normal School, East Florida 
Seminary, South Florida College, and Florida Agricultural Institute.  The act 
included orders that colleges’ properties “are hereby declared forfeit and revert to 
the State of Florida” and that “all continuing appropriations heretofore made to 
said institutions…are hereby revoked” (p. 4).  It also specified that “all Boards of 
Trustees, managers and officers of the several institutions…are hereby 
abolished” (p. 5).  In essence, the legislature ordered these institutions to cease 
to exist entirely. 
 In their places, the legislature directed new institutions to be established.  
The act established a Colored Normal School, the University of the State of 
Florida for men, and Florida Female College.  The legislation specified the terms 
of the new boards and directed how new sites would be selected for the 
respective campuses.  It also created a new “Board of Control” which “shall have 
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jurisdiction over and complete management and control of all the said 
institutions” (p. 7).  The act also mandated academic and entrance exam 
standards for the University of the State of Florida, requiring that, “No student 
shall be admitted to the University of the State of Florida who has not passed a 
satisfactory examination at some High School and through the twelfth grade as 
now established, or some other institution of learning having an equivalent of 
instruction to the twelfth grade” (p. 9). 
 The universities, led by the state’s attorney general, filed suit to void the 
legislation.  The attorney general presented several reasons why the act should 
be declared unconstitutional:  that the legislature was constitutionally prohibited 
from relocating campuses, that it could not impose academic requirements 
(completion of twelfth grade and standardized exams), that the Board of Control’s 
make-up was not supported by the state constitution, and other various technical 
legal objections.  The precise nature of the legalistic arguments is not relevant to 
this discussion.  The crux of the conflict is that the legislature, obviously believing 
that drastic changes needed to occur within Florida higher education, sought to 
exercise its power and, in many senses, begin with a blank slate.   
 To summarize the court’s finding, it ruled in favor of the legislature in all 
respects.  The court was clear and decisive in its language, stating, “The trustees 
are made by this legislation the agents of the State to collect and disburse 
property appropriated by the General Government to the State for a public 
purpose.  There is not and never was any private property in the trustees in the 
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funds.  They were derived from government…The only right they have to it is by 
the legislation of the State” (p. 20).  In other words, the trustees did not act as 
independent agents—their powers were given to them by the state legislature 
and could just as easily be (and would be) taken away.  The court carried this 
theme throughout its decision.  It articulated that higher education’s power in 
Florida emanated from the legislature.  The court saw that the ultimate power to 
determine university policy rested with the legislature, and that the trustees were 
merely acting as agents of the legislature and were subject to legislative 
directives. 
 The court also responded at length regarding one of the attorney general’s 
contentions, which was that the imposition of academic standards violated 
students’ constitutional rights.  The court strongly disagreed, writing, “It surely 
cannot be seriously contended that the Legislature has not the right to provide 
proper educational qualifications for admission to the college so created by the 
Legislature… Undoubtedly some judgment and discretion were to be used by the 
Legislature in prescribing these qualifications, otherwise how could the institution 
in question be a college?” (p. 21).  Regarding the attorney general’s statement 
that the legislature was not authorized to relocate institutions, the court 
responded that the decision was up to the legislature such that it was “in their 
[the legislature’s] judgment, would be best for the interest of the State” (p. 23).   
The court recognized the importance of its decision, ending its ruling by 
saying, “We have realized the gravity of the questions involved and of their far-
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reaching consequences to the public, and have reached the conclusions 
announced herein only after the most thorough investigation and mature 
consideration” (p. 35).  There were the very immediate implications—the closure 
of established institutions and the creation of new ones.  But, there were also 
long-term implications about what entity controlled the plight of higher education.  
In this case, it was clearly the legislature.  In addition, it should not be lost on us 
that the governing board for the new higher education system in Florida was 
named the “Board of Control.”  As a new governing body, the Board of Control 
exercised new power over new institutions. 
The State ex rel. Harry T. Heimberger, Appellant, v. Board of Curators of the 
University of Missouri, a Corporation; D. R. Francis, J. C. Parrish, C. B. 
Rollins, Samuel Sparrow, John H. Bradley and G. L. Zwick, Constituting a 
Majority of Members (268 Mo. 598, 1916) 
 
 Whereas many cases address important issues such as financial 
resources, this Missouri case is one of the few during this time period that 
addressed conflict and power that touched so directly an institution’s academic 
program.  Although the nature of the case is different from others, it nonetheless 
provides a compelling example of how state legislatures and public colleges 
often had different agendas. 
 In 1915, the legislature amended the state’s statutes to add language that 
affected the University of Missouri as follows (italics are the additions):  “The 
leading objects of said colleges shall be to teach such branches as are related to 
agriculture and mechanic arts and mining, including military tactics, and without 
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excluding other scientific and classical studies, in order to promote liberal and 
practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and 
professions of life” (p. 6).  Furthermore, the legislature added bachelor of science 
degrees in several areas of engineering.  In effect, the legislature’s actions 
demonstrated that it—not the university faculty, administrative personnel, or 
board—had the power to add and remove programs and degrees. 
 The college responded in a way that is unsurprising.  The university and 
its board “simply deny the power of the General Assembly to exert over them any 
authority of the kind implied by the enactment of this amendment.  Their position 
is that they are independent of the General Assembly and not subject to its 
direction or control in any manner or degree” (p. 7).  This is a compelling 
conflict—the legislature desired to add degree programs and perhaps even 
change the nature of the educational experience by adding a version of a liberal 
arts curriculum, while the college steadfastly denied that the legislature had any 
power to do so.  The court recognized the level of the conflict by pointing out that, 
“Counsel [for the university] does not mince words.  In plain language they state 
their contention to be that…the board of curators [represent] a separate and 
distinct department of the State Government, over which the General Assembly 
has no power and with which it has practically nothing to do except make such 
appropriations as it deems proper” (p. 9).   
 The college did not simply argue that this conflict was about the power to 
control the curriculum, but also that the legislature’s actions could cause 
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irreparable harm to the college.  For example, it argued that the “establishment in 
the School of Mines and Metallurgy…would be and is quivalent [sic] to the 
disestablishment of the College of Agriculture to the extent to which students who 
might pursue those studies in the last named school might or would be attracted 
to the School of Mines and Metallurgy” (p. 8).  In other words, the college worried 
that the new programs in mining could overshadow the traditional programs in 
agriculture and could diminish the College of Agriculture’s mission.  On this point, 
the court noted that there was no constitutional prohibition against establishing 
new programs at colleges, and furthermore argued that the college’s contention 
was untenable because adopting the college’s “interpretation would be to 
preclude the General Assembly from providing in high schools and normal 
schools courses of study overlapping that freshman students in the University” 
(p. 8).   
 The college also observed that the establishment of the new programs 
was not needed.  The court also rejected this claim and dismissed the relevance 
of whether the programs were needed or unneeded, stating that the constitution 
“forbids nothing in the way of aid and maintenance.  It simply commands that aid 
shall be given under stated conditions.  The argument falls with the incorrect 
interpretation upon which it is based” (p. 9).  Put differently, because the state 
constitution did not specifically forbid the General Assembly from establishing 
new programs at the university, it necessarily retained the power to do so.  The 
court later states this clearly:  “The legislative power, subject to the limitations 
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contained in the Constitution, is vested in the General Assembly of the State of 
Missouri.  The General Assembly retains all legislative power not expressly or by 
necessary implication forbidden it by the Constitution” (p. 10). 
 Heimberger’s outcome is compelling because it addressed significant 
issues related to governance.  Whereas other courts in this study often deferred 
to colleges when constitutional language was unclear, the Missouri Supreme 
Court ruled quite the opposite—that the lack of specificity in the state constitution 
meant that the power to govern rested with the General Assembly, not the 
university or its board.  Had other courts made similar rulings, the landscape of 
higher education could be much different today.   
State ex rel Prchal, Appellants, v. Dailey, et al, Respondents (57 S.D. 554, 
1931) 
 
 Although Prchal is a case that was initiated by a taxpayer, the South 
Dakota Supreme Court considered important issues and ruled such that it greatly 
diminished the power of the system’s regents.  In 1881, the state legislature 
authorized the creation of normal schools for the purpose of instructing teachers.  
The colleges were also authorized to “give instruction in the mechanical arts and 
in husbandry and in agricultural chemistry” (p. 3).  Given the growth in higher 
education and changing demands/needs for college education, the regents 
responded with the addition of programs:  “the regents have prescribed additional 
curricula for these schools leading to advanced degrees, have changed the 
names of the schools designating them as colleges, and have established them 
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as teachers’ colleges authorized to teach a college course and to train teachers 
qualified to teach in the high schools and other institutions of higher learning” (p. 
3).  The taxpayer claimed that the regents assumed that they had more power 
than they actually had been granted by the state constitution and by the 
legislature.  As a result, he sued, stating that their actions were unconstitutional 
and that their power to make these changes should be rescinded. 
 The court considered three arguments that the regents made in support of 
their continuing to award degrees and teach courses beyond those originally 
prescribed in the legislation.  First, the regents argued “that under the 
Constitution…the ‘control’ of the institutions necessarily includes the power to 
prescribe their curricula” (p. 4).  The court reasoned that, even if the regents 
have the power to control the curriculum, they must do so within the confines of 
legislative authority.  By so drastically changing the curriculum (albeit with noble 
intentions), the regents essentially changed the character of the institution:  the 
colleges have been “created by the regents.  There is no direct specific 
legislation to effect that change, and since the regents have no power to 
establish schools or colleges, their action cannot be sustained” (p. 4).  The court 
acknowledged that although the regents had “very broad powers in respect to the 
curricula under their control, it is self-evident that they cannot by the exercise of 
that power change their character” (p. 5). 
 Second, the regents argued that they should not be prohibited from their 
curricular activities because they “have acted honestly and in good faith in an 
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honest exercise of a discretion legally vested in them” (p. 5).  The court 
recognized that the regents had indeed acted nobly but, “If the acts are 
unauthorized, the good faith in which they are performed cannot authorize them” 
(p. 5).  This ruling echoes sentiments other courts expressed about whether an 
act can continue as accepted because it has become standard practice, even if it 
is unconstitutional. 
 Third, the regents argued that the nature of teacher preparation education 
had evolved with time, and so too must it be allowed to evolve in South Dakota.  
They rejected the notion that they had constructed their own curricula outside of 
legislative directive.  The court methodically considered the history of what had 
transpired during the three decades that had passed since the original legislation 
authorizing the creation of normal schools in the state.  It also consulted similar 
events in other states.  The court found that, in other states, “We have found no 
case in which the raise in rank without legislation has been effected and 
sustained by the court” (p. 5).  Furthermore, the court argued that it viewed its 
decision as ultimately protecting the graded school system.  If a college that had 
been established in support of grade school teacher education was usurped by 
another college offering a similar teacher preparation program (whether the 
intentions were noble or not), then the plight of grade school education in the 
state may suffer.  Ultimately, the court found that, “It is for the Legislature to 
determine the educational policy of the state, not for this court or the regents” (p. 
6).  The use of the term “policy” is an important one here.  The court did not seek 
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to undermine the regents’ ability to conduct normal business, nor did the 
legislature or a state official raise such a challenge.  Instead, this case focused 
on who has the power to create policy, and the court clearly sided with the 
legislature:  “These provisions [in the legislation] plainly fix the limits of the 
powers granted the regents.  We do not find anything in the legislation that can 
fairly be said to delegate power to the regents to change the purpose, character, 
or scope of any school under their control” (p. 7). 
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Chapter Three:   
Study Outcomes, Limitations, and Further Research 
 
Study Outcomes 
 
 This study’s thesis is that courts helped regulate the balance of power, 
and that this was necessary given the “wild experiment” that Blackmar suggests 
characterized models for funding and governance for higher education.  In 
supporting this thesis, there are six themes outlined below that discuss the 
relevance of this study to how we understand the history of higher education.  
This discussion is not designed to repeat the observations made about each of 
the preceding cases, but rather synthesizes the major points about them as a 
group.   
 The power of evaluating a large group of cases is that we can more easily 
identify themes or patterns.  Within this collection of cases, we see patterns 
emerge that enhance our understanding regarding how and why public 
institutions developed as they did, particularly regarding how their relationships 
with their respective states developed and changed.  In fact, when considered 
alone, one may draw conclusions about a case that are quite the opposite of the 
conclusions that become evident when evaluating the group of cases as a whole. 
 Each of the themes below echoes a unifying point about the relationships 
between public colleges and their states:  state officials, including many courts, 
were not content to allow higher education to chart its own course or with minimal 
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supervision without at least raising significant questions.  Regardless of whether 
the court ruled in favor of the college or not, the fact that the questions were even 
being raised indicates a pattern of concern with how higher education was 
growing and developing.   
Outcome 1:  Cases were important; they carried significant implications for 
higher education and impacted its development.  Courts helped shape the 
future of higher education.  
 
 These cases are full of rich details and fascinating information.  With court 
cases, we can come to understand both sides of an argument.  Many U.S. 
Supreme Court cases receive deserved attention, but state cases often do not, 
particularly among higher education scholars.  As this study shows, state cases 
carried important implications for colleges. Had courts ruled differently in most of 
the cases selected, issues such as power, autonomy, and control would have 
evolved much differently in those states.   
 As we consider this outcome—that cases carried important implications—
let us first consider the cases that involved the management of federal land grant 
funds.  Land grant cases generally fall into two categories.  The first category 
involves cases such as Montana’s Koch v. Barret in which a state official 
attempted (with varying levels of success) to influence how land grant funds were 
spent, while the second category of cases such as New Mexico v. Graham 
involved colleges’ attempts to utilize land grant proceeds for expenses other than 
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investments in permanent endowments.  Both of these issues merit further 
discussion.   
 As we consider the first category of cases in which state officials 
attempted to exercise control over federal funds, there is a common theme—that 
state officials argued that legislatures should officially appropriate land grant 
funds just as they appropriated non-federal (state) funds.  If we reflect upon the 
information presented in Chapter 1 about governments and their quest for 
efficiencies, it is unsurprising that state officials challenged how colleges spent 
money.  After all, at the same time that colleges sought more money and greater 
autonomy, states were eager with other state agencies to achieve greater 
efficiencies and more oversight.  The gap between what colleges wanted and 
what states sought from other agencies was destined to create the kind of 
conflict that we see in several cases.   
 In nearly all cases in this study, courts ruled that colleges—not their 
respective states—had the ability to control how federal grant funds could be 
spent.  Although it is impossible to know how the higher education landscape 
would have changed if courts had allowed state legislatures to assume a greater 
role in appropriating those funds, we can assume that colleges would have had 
fewer freedoms.  There would likely have been practical considerations—that a 
state legislature would have different spending priorities than the college—but 
there was also a philosophical outcome of these cases.  With these rulings, many 
courts distinguished higher education as a special entity.  Several courts used 
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this issue as an opportunity to describe public colleges as dissimilar from other 
state agencies and, as such, clarified that public colleges had special privileges. 
 The second category regarding federal grant funds evident from this 
study—whether colleges could use land grant proceeds for current operations or 
building construction rather than investing those funds into a permanent 
endowment—also bears further discussion.  Colleges, boards, and even 
legislatures at times sought to circumvent this requirement with creative 
maneuvers such as offering bond sales, with bonds being repaid using land grant 
revenues.  Courts unanimously rejected these efforts.  Why was this important?  
As a result of these rulings, public colleges no doubt had to defer expansion and 
construction plans.  Such financial requirements likely meant that plans to 
expand numbers of students they could serve, the faculties they could hire, and 
so on, prevented public colleges from growing as quickly as if they had gained 
quicker access to the land grant funds.  However, by deferring short-term 
projects, the colleges’ balance sheets benefitted by being invested into 
permanent endowment funds, which has certainly led to long-term benefits that 
those institutions enjoy even today.  Let us take the example the 1909 case of 
University of Utah v. Candland.  In that case, the university proposed to use 
$250,000 in funds designated to be deposited into the permanent endowment 
and instead construct a building.  We do not know how the fund would have been 
invested, but certainly the $250,000 would be worth several million dollars now, 
more than a century later.  Furthermore, it is possible that the building 
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constructed in 1909 would no longer be useful (or in existence) today, whereas a 
permanent endowment would have generated investment returns and revenues 
for the past century. 
 Outside of land grant fund management, we also see many cases that 
involve legislatures’ or state officials’ attempts to exercise other financial and 
governance controls.  An early assumption as this study began is that courts 
would be generally consistent with how they treated colleges—that is, that they 
would either have been deferential to colleges or deferential to state officials or 
legislatures.  Although there are critical cases that demonstrate courts’ deference 
to colleges, others were clear victories for state officials.  On one extreme, cases 
in Michigan and Minnesota clearly delineated the powers between colleges and 
states, with great and enduring deference to public colleges.  At the opposite 
extreme, Missouri’s Heimberger established that colleges lacked the power to 
establish their own curriculum, while Florida’s Ellis clarified that trustees were 
primarily designated to execute the will of the legislature.  What can we make of 
these extremes?  One lesson is that it is difficult to discuss “public higher 
education” and conflicts and power during this time period in general terms.  
Court rulings were based on many factors, including constitutional provisions 
(discussed in Outcome 3 later in this chapter), but also on individual states’ 
circumstances that are difficult to generalize.  These cases reveal that the way 
that states and public institutions would interact during the decades that followed 
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were unique to each state thanks to how differently courts interpreted matters of 
power. 
Beyond that observation, we must take note that courts settled matters 
that were critical to how higher education developed.  The courts’ 
aforementioned rulings in Michigan and Minnesota assured that public colleges 
would enjoy autonomy to set their own agendas for years to come.  There are 
also compelling stories about how power was settled between the extremes.  In 
Kentucky, although the Barker ruling did not assure public colleges that they 
would enjoy complete autonomy, it weakened the legislature’s power to meddle 
in public institutions’ budgets.  In Ohio, we saw the court certify that the 
University of Cincinnati was indeed—for the lack of a better term—a “real” 
college that should be allowed to function like one with a presidential home and 
the permission for faculty and staff to engage in professional development.  In 
Florida, the court permitted the immediate closure of several public institutions, 
no doubt changing the higher education landscape in that state.  These cases 
carried compelling short-term and long-term implications for each of the public 
institutions in each state.  
Outcome 2:  Decisions were often about short-term growth vs. long-term 
investments.  At the heart of many cases was a strong ambition on the part 
of public colleges to grow.  Courts were more concerned about long-term 
viability. 
 
 The theme of growth is most prevalent in the cases related to land grant 
disputes.  In most of the selected cases with this theme, we see colleges (often 
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with the endorsement of the state legislature) attempt to use land grant funds for 
either current budget expenses or for construction projects.  In response, state 
officials (typically treasurers or auditors) challenged their ability to do so, usually 
due to state constitutional requirements that stipulated that land grant proceeds 
must be deposited into institutions’ permanent endowment funds.  As public 
colleges grew, they obviously needed larger budgets and additional space for 
student housing and for academic needs.  Land grant funds were regarded an 
easy source for them to receive revenues to suit their needs.   
 As colleges were fixated on short-term needs, state officials—and 
courts—were noticeably focused not only on following appropriate laws but also 
on colleges’ long-term needs.  For example, in North Dakota, the court conveyed 
its concern about using land grant funds to buy bonds because it wondered what 
would happen if the university defaulted on the bonds.  Some courts even 
expressed regret that their decisions would disappoint colleges, but they were 
more concerned with the long-term benefits of having healthy endowments. 
 These cases highlight important points about the history of higher 
education.  Colleges were eager to grow and to gain additional resources.  
Based on the creative ways that some of their funding programs were designed, 
it is safe to say that colleges were aware of the regulations but sought loopholes.  
The evidence shows that legislatures were often complicit in these plans.  So, as 
this study discusses issues of power, the power struggle was often not between 
a legislature and a college, but rather between other state officials (auditors, 
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treasurers, and attorneys general) and a given college.  Legislatures were eager 
to see their public colleges thrive.  In addition, if a college had more immediate 
access to land grant funds, it would have taken pressure off legislatures to 
appropriate state revenues. 
Outcome 3:  The importance of state constitutions cannot be overstated. 
State constitutions, often written in the 1800s when public higher education 
was in its infancy, were incredibly important.  
 
 The notion that state constitutional provisions are important to higher 
education is not a new idea.  Hutchens (2009) observed that, “In seeking to strike 
a balance between acceptable state oversight versus the need to safeguard the 
authority of public colleges and universities to manage their own affairs, some 
states rely on constitutional provisions to limit excessive state governmental 
intrusion” (p. 271).  What this study demonstrates is that constitutional provisions 
were so important this early in higher education’s development.  In the selected 
cases, most of the constitutions being referred to originated in the mid to late 
1800s; Hutchens (2009) notes that Michigan in 1850 was the first state with a 
constitution that addressed higher education (p. 282).  Blackmar (1890) finds that 
states began seeking official support for public colleges even earlier than that 
point.  “After the Declaration of Independence the provisions relating to education 
assumed a more decidedly political tone.  Sentiments began to be expressed in 
favor of universities, created, controlled, and supported by the State.  The 
colonies had received a new political baptism, and the ideas of sovereign States 
began to grow and the national consciousness to awaken…there was added a 
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new zeal for educated citizenship” (p. 24).  The fact that state constitutions—
written before some states even gained statehood—would have such important 
implications for higher education years later is remarkable. 
 In several cases, we see the importance of constitutional provisions, 
whether they were strong, weak, or seemingly nonexistent.  For example, in 
Montana, the state supreme court relied on the state’s constitutional language in 
Haire v. Rice to reject any use of land grant proceeds for purposes other than 
endowment investments.  In Kentucky’s Barker v. Crum, the court referred to the 
state constitution to determine that the state legislature had overstepped its 
authority by imposing requirements regarding how a public college could spend 
its appropriated funds.  Missouri’s Heimberger v. University of Missouri cited 
constitutional language that, in the court’s view, gave the legislature greater 
control of the academic program.  These were important rulings but also indicate 
that public colleges and states were exploring and arguing about issues related 
to constitutional autonomy long before modern times and that these constitutional 
provisions were critical in providing guidance to courts during this time period. 
Outcome 4:  Federal funds led to conflict.  The introduction of federal 
money into the system of higher education is a primary driver of conflict. 
 
This was the most surprising observation in this study.  The flow of new 
federal funds into higher education beginning in the mid to late 1800s is well-
documented.  However, the case law that followed implementation has not been 
adequately explored by researchers.  That the introduction of federal funds would 
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represent such a common source of conflict is striking.  This study reveals that 
the source of the federal funds—whether from the Morrill Land Grant Act, the 
Enabling Act, or other acts that primarily supported agricultural research—did not 
really matter.  Conflicts primarily arose in two ways—the disagreement over 
whether legislatures must appropriate land grant funds and whether colleges 
could utilize land grant income for current operations or construction rather than 
endowment investing.  This again is a benefit to studying several cases together, 
as we are able to see common themes that developed in states that had much 
different histories and institutions.   
Whether land grant programs such as the Morrill Land Grant Act were as 
transformational as some historians have argued is a matter of debate (Key, 
1996 and Thelin, 2004).  That being said, the introduction of federal monies into 
a system that had previously not enjoyed such generosity generated a series of 
conflicts across the system of public higher education.  Whether the issue was 
the legislative appropriation requirement or how to spend the money, these 
conflicts were serious.  They led courts in several cases to make clearer 
distinctions between the power that a college possesses versus power that was 
relegated to the legislature or to the state as a whole via its constitution.  In other 
words, even if we accept that land grants did not result in the grandiose, literal 
building of colleges and universities, the introduction of the federal money into 
higher education led to debates between colleges and states that would not have 
materialized in that money’s absence.   
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Outcome 5:  State officials served critical roles.  Their roles are understated 
in the history of higher education; they pushed back when they saw 
colleges expanding their power too far.   
 
Out of the twenty-four cases in this study, nineteen placed colleges in 
conflict with government officials such as state auditors, treasurers, or attorneys 
general.  Obviously, with these cases being so focused on financial matters, it is 
not necessarily surprising that auditors and treasurers would be at the center of 
the litigation.  However, it nonetheless speaks to the advocacy roles that these 
state officials viewed themselves as having. 
One benefit to studying several cases is that doing so allows us to identify 
patterns that are not obvious when reading one or two cases.  After all, if one 
reads a singular case, it may be tempting to discount the influence of an 
individual state official and assume that they were motivated by personality 
conflicts or by politics.  Personality and politics were no doubt factors in some 
cases.  But, the fact that so many cases were instigated by state auditors, 
treasurers, and attorneys general from different states leads us to conclude that 
there were other factors.  One’s motivation, particularly if they are an elected 
politician, is difficult to ascertain.  However, reading through the court cases 
reveals that these officials expressed genuine concerns about colleges’ efficiency 
and autonomy.  No doubt, they were trying their best to navigate a greatly 
changed landscape of governmental funding and influence. 
Were these state officials interested in shifting power from the universities 
to themselves or their offices?  That was likely not the case.  After all, in most 
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cases that involved such officials, they were not seeking to retain direct oversight 
of certain expenditures.  Rather, they were working to ensure that colleges were 
following regulations, so in that sense they were advocating that power be 
redirected to other entities—often the legislature. 
Outcome 6:  The “Wild Experiment” lived up to its name.  Many of the 
conflicts we see are rooted in experimentation that had allowed colleges to 
be established and/or grow by 1900. 
 
 Among the selected cases, virtually all of them dealt with a funding 
component of one type or another.  In 1890, Blackmar expressed 
discouragement regarding the state of affairs related to higher education’s 
funding model.  He noted that “the facts before us show a vast amount of weak 
and misdirected legislation in the management of the funds granted by the 
Federal Government and the several States for carrying on institutions of 
learning…There is one redeeming feature; the great majority of legislators in 
States, seeing the profligate waste of school funds hitherto, are now rallying to 
the support of State institutions, and are seemingly determined to redeem the 
errors of the past by careful legislation in the present and future” (p. 38).  He 
proceeded to note that “the lawgivers of new States hastened to plant 
universities, which had to pass through long periods of inactivity and meager 
support…during which the handling of the funds, in many instances, was a wild 
experiment” (pp. 38-39).   
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 As we reflect upon Blackmar’s comments and the cases in this study, the 
pieces fit together quite well.  As Blackmar stated, the environment in which 
regulations were formed and colleges were built was highly experimental.  It was 
no doubt an exciting time when states wanted colleges to succeed and colleges 
wanted the same.  Nonetheless, following experimentation of this magnitude, 
recalibrations and revisions were bound to be needed.  The courts served as the 
entities that determined how those recalibrations and revisions would be 
implemented. 
 This study brings to light not only the experimental nature of higher 
education funding mechanisms, but also illuminates how those experiments led 
to power struggles.  The most significant experiment included federal grants, and 
we see numerous conflicts erupting due to how states and colleges had differing 
interpretations of federal grant regulations.  We also see in nearly every case that 
conflict erupted and power was questioned because of experimental—or perhaps 
youthful—financial arrangements between states and colleges.   
Blackmar’s work highlights two concepts that we see prevalent in these 
cases.  The first is his point that there was weak legislation.  Blackmar does not 
explain in detail what he is referring to, but we certainly do see legislation leading 
to a number of problems, and it often reflected what we may assume is a 
misunderstanding of what the law permitted, particularly in cases that feature 
conflicts about federal funds.  It was often left to state treasurers and auditors—
and ultimately to the courts—to try to address such legislation.  The second is 
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that state legislatures were becoming more active.  Blackmar frames this activity 
as “rallying to the support” of public institutions (p. 39).  Indeed, we do see some 
legislatures that rallied to support colleges, often using methods that state 
officials and later courts found questionable or unconstitutional.   
In summary, states were eager to expand higher education.  There were 
no examples in this study’s research that indicated that states were trying to 
suppress higher education’s growth.  Colleges and their leaders, one might 
imagine, were even more eager to grow.  In an industry where most public 
colleges were fairly new—and even some states were quite new—there was a 
healthy amount of experimentation.  Was it wild experimentation, as Blackmar 
suggests?  Indeed it was.  When we think of wild experimentation, we may 
assume that it was careless, which would be inaccurate in this case.  Instead, it 
was experimentation that was wild in the sense that it was creative and 
innovative.  Experiments, by nature, involve successes, failures, recalibrations, 
questions, and conflicts.  We see many of those elements of experimentation in 
the cases reviewed in this study.   
Finally, Blackmar’s work combined with studying these cases supplies us 
with very early insights into what issues were important for policymakers.  
Blackmar surely was not the only person who recognized that these funding 
models were experimental.  Studying these cases confirms his observations, 
though—that there were well-intentioned policymakers at both the federal and 
state levels who genuinely wanted to strengthen higher education, but because 
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they were conducting experiments, they often missed details or failed to be as 
specific as they should have been.  Likewise, colleges—also well-intentioned and 
genuinely wanting to become stronger, larger, or more influential—became 
overly ambitious in their quests to find new resources. 
Study Limitations and Future Research 
 
 I once mentioned to Neal Hutchens, who kindly served as my independent 
study professor two years ago, that condensing research on legal issues from 
this time period into one semester’s independent study was unrealistic—that it 
could honestly be one’s life-long project.  Even with a dissertation that took much 
longer than one semester to complete, I still believe that there is a substantial 
amount of research to be done in this area.  Many of these cases deserve their 
own dissertations, or at least articles, as they individually were so important.  
Although this study’s purpose was to evaluate the importance of these cases in 
an aggregate form, it was nonetheless tempting to dig even more deeply into 
several of the case’s stories.   
 One important study limitation is that many of us know from personal and 
professional experiences that legal cases are not always the result of 
professional conflicts, but also are personal in nature.  Although court 
proceedings provide a rich level of detail that I argue has not been adequately 
explored in the past, they are limited, as there are human elements that are 
generally not evident in these cases.  For example, from some earlier research 
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not related to this study, I learned that in Kentucky’s Barker v. Crum, while there 
were certainly legal reasons that led to court proceedings, there were personality 
conflicts between the university’s president and the legislature that certainly are 
not explained in the court opinions.  No doubt, there are other examples of this in 
other cases.  Although this study demonstrates that there are patterns of conflict 
that may have little to do with personality, we cannot discount the importance of 
human elements that influence these cases. 
 As discussed in the Introduction, this study intentionally is limited to a time 
period of approximately thirty years.  If we looked either thirty years prior to the 
beginning point of this study (1870 to 1900) or thirty years later (1930 to 1960), 
what would we see?  Would we see similar conflicts, or would those conflicts 
have been replaced by other issues?  These are compelling questions.  This 
study’s importance could be contextualized by answering those questions, but as 
they are outside of this study’s scope, this is a limitation. 
 The role of state constitutions is another source of curiosity.  Given how 
critical state constitutions were in helping courts to craft their rulings, there are 
great opportunities for additional research that can investigate how and why state 
constitutions’ language regarding higher education evolved.  For example, who 
was involved and how did the players even know what to write about higher 
education given it was so new to many states?  Many state constitutions’ framers 
demonstrated a genius that benefits higher education even today. 
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 Finally, this study admittedly focuses on the pertinent issues that each 
case addresses and the ensuing court rulings.  There are many more angles that 
one may explore with this type of research, such as how colleges reacted to 
rulings, or how newspapers characterized the reactions to those rulings.  This 
study focuses on the cases themselves, but how colleges, state officials, and 
others reacted is an interesting line of research.  Having said that, one must 
figure out how and where to draw the line with research.  Charles Russo (1996), 
once a University of Kentucky professor, noted that students can get “lost at the 
talk of reporters, digests, and Shephard’s Citations” but that in such instances he 
“sought to allay their concerns by pointing out that the legal method and other 
forms of research serve essentially the same purpose:  they are all interested in 
arriving at a better understanding of the question at hand” (p. 34).  It is likewise 
the hope that this research—although it was not designed to cover every angle of 
every case—has led to that better understanding that Russo discusses. 
Final Thoughts 
 
 I note the importance of storytelling to historians.  We often look to primary 
source documents for perspectives on what occurred regarding a certain event at 
a certain time.  Often, we rely on newspaper articles, diaries, trustee meeting 
minutes, and so on.  These are excellent primary sources.  But, case law is really 
quite special.  With many types of primary resources, it is more difficult to 
understand the details of sometimes very complex issues.  We may learn only 
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one side of an argument from a diary entry, or we may know only the final 
outcome of a decision when reading a newspaper article.  Court cases are a rich 
source of not only great levels of details, but also they tend to be very objectively 
written and they lead us understand both sides of an argument.  In that sense, 
case law is an extremely valuable tool for research that I believe has been 
underutilized.  I should also note that court cases from this time period are 
actually quite readable for a non-legal scholar.  It seems that courts were 
intentionally clear with how different arguments and logic informed their 
decisions.  They are fascinating and enjoyable reads. 
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Appendix A 
 
Cases are organized in the table below are ordered first by category, then 
by state, and then by year in situations where there are multiple cases within one 
state. 
The Power to Control Public Institution Finances 
Case Name State Year Case Citation Entity in Conflict 
with College 
The Indiana State Board of 
Finance et al. v. State of 
Indiana, ex rel. Trustees of 
Purdue University. 
Indiana 1919 188 Ind. 36 State Board of 
Finance 
Bosworth, Auditor v. State 
University, et al. 
Kentucky 1913 154 Ky. 370 State Auditor 
Barker, President, et al. v. 
Crum, et al. 
Kentucky 1917 177 Ky. 637 Student 
Board of Regents of the 
University of Michigan v. 
Auditor General 
Michigan 1911 167 Mich. 444 State Auditor 
State Board of Agriculture 
v. Auditor General 
Michigan 1914 180 Mich. 349 State Auditor 
State ex rel. University of 
Minnesota and Others v. 
Ray P. Chase 
Minnesota 1928 175 Minn. 259 State Auditor 
Lincoln University v. 
George E. Hackmann, 
State Auditor. 
Missouri 1922 295 Mo. 118 State Auditor 
Agricultural and 
Mechanical College v. B.R. 
Lacy, State Treasurer 
North 
Carolina 
1902 130 N.C. 364 State Treasurer 
Cincinnati (City) v. Frank J. 
Jones et al, 
Ohio 1905 16 Ohio Dec. 
343 
City Solicitor 
Regents of the State 
University v. Trapp, Auditor 
(28 Okla. 83, 1911) 
Oklahoma 1911 28 Okla. 83 State Auditor 
Peebly v. Childers, State 
Auditor (Regents of 
University of Oklahoma, 
Interveners) 
Oklahoma 1923 95 Okla. 40 State Auditor 
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The Power to Manage Land Grant Funds 
 
 
Case Name State Year Case Citation Entity in Conflict 
with College 
H. Melgard, Treasurer of 
the Board of Regents of 
the University of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, v. John W. 
Eagleson, Treasurer of the 
State of Idaho, and 
Clarence Van Deusen, 
Auditor of the State of 
Idaho, Defendants. 
Idaho 1918 31 Idaho 411 State Treasurer 
Evan Evans et al., as State 
Board of Education and 
Board of Regents of the 
University of Idaho, 
Plaintiffs, v. Clarence Van 
Deusen, Auditor, and John 
W. Eagleson, Treasurer, of 
the State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Idaho 1918 31 Idaho 614 State Treasurer 
State ex rel. Koch, Relator 
v. Barret, State Treasurer, 
Respondent 
Montana 1901 26 Mont. 62 State Auditor and 
Attorney General 
Montana ex rel. Haire v. 
Rice, as State Treasurer, 
Respondent 
Montana 1906 
 
1907 
33 Mont. 365 
 
204 U.S. 291 
State Treasurer 
State, ex rel. Spencer Lens 
Company, Relator, v. 
Edwin M. Searle, Jr. 
Auditor, Respondent 
Nebraska 1906 77 Neb. 155 State Auditor 
Regents of University of 
New Mexico v. Graham, 
State Treasurer, et al. 
New Mexico 1928 33 N.M. 214 State Treasurer 
State ex rel. Board of 
University and School 
Lands v. McMillan, State 
Treasurer 
North 
Dakota 
1903 12 N.D. 280 State Treasurer 
State ex rel. University of 
Utah v. Candland et al., 
State Board of Land 
Commissioners 
Utah 1909 36 Utah 406 Attorney General 
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Case Name State Year Case Citation Entity in Conflict 
with College 
The State of Washington, 
on the Relation of Arthur 
W. Davis et al., Plaintiff, v. 
C. W. Clausen, as State 
Auditor, Respondent 
Washington 1931 
(filed 
in 
1930) 
160 Wash. 618 State Auditor 
Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming 
Agricultural College v. 
Irvine, Treasurer of the 
State of Wyoming 
Wyoming 1907 206 U.S. 278 State Treasurer 
 
 
The Power to Control the University 
 
Case Name State Year Case Citation Entity in Conflict 
with College 
The State of Florida, by W. 
H. Ellis, Attorney-General 
of Said State Upon the 
Relation of F. B. Moodie, 
Fred L. Stringer, a Trustee 
of the University of Florida, 
and the City of Lake City, a 
Municipal Corporation, 
Relator, v N.P. Bryan, A.L. 
Brown, Nathaniel Adams, 
P.K. Yonge, and T.B. King, 
as the State Board of 
Control, Respondents  
Florida 1905 50 Fla. 293 State Board of 
Control 
State ex rel. Harry T. 
Heimberger, Appellant v. 
Board of Curators of the 
University of Missouri, a 
Corporation 
Missouri 1916 268 Mo. 598 Student 
State ex rel Prchal, 
Appellants, v. Dailey, et al, 
Respondents 
South 
Dakota 
1931 57 S.D. 554 Taxpayer 
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